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Higher Volatility with Lower Credit Spreads: The Puzzle and Its Solution
Aleksey Semenov
This dissertation explains the puzzling negative relationship between changes in stock
volatility and credit spreads of corporate bonds. This relationship has been encountered
in some empirical studies but has remained unexplained in the theoretical literature, which
unanimously suggests the opposite relationship. This dissertation shows that this negative
relationship can be produced by the dynamic endogenous asset composition of borrowing
firms. On the one hand, higher asset volatility corresponds to lower future volatility of the
firm’s investments and lower credit spreads if the firm can reallocate resources optimally. On
the other hand, short-term stock volatility corresponds to the current allocation of resources
and thus increases with asset volatility. The combination of these two effects produces the
negative relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit spreads.
The empirical part of the dissertation shows that the relationship between changes in
stock market volatility and credit spreads of long-term, high-quality corporate bonds (con-
trolling for other variables) is negative, robust, and economically significant. Consistent
with the predictions in this dissertation, the corresponding regression coeffi cient is a U-
shaped function of the credit quality of the bonds. In addition, the dissertation shows that
the relationship changes its sign in distressed market conditions and that a combination of
normal and distressed market conditions can produce erroneous results.
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1 Introduction
The existing theoretical literature uniformly suggests a positive relationship between changes
in stock volatility and credit spreads of corporate bonds, in accordance with the perception
that higher volatility corresponds to a higher probability of default.1 Some empirical stud-
ies, however, have obtained results indicating a negative relationship (controlling for other
variables) in the case of investment grade debt.2 This relationship remains unexplored and
unexplained, since no existing model can produce such a relationship. Using a comprehen-
sive set of bond transaction data, the present study empirically confirms that in the case of
long-term, high-quality corporate debt, the negative relationship between changes in stock
volatility and credit spreads is robust and economically significant.3 The paper also provides
a model to explain this negative relationship.
This paper extends Leland’s (1994) capital structure framework and incorporates endoge-
nous asset composition using the approach in Merton’s (1969) model. Leland (1994) presents
a capital structure model with long-term debt financing and strategic bankruptcy. In that
model, the firm chooses the optimal structure of the right-hand side of the balance sheet
(liabilities and owners’equity). One of the assumptions in that model is that the left-hand
(asset) side of the firm’s balance sheet is fixed: all funds are invested in the risky project.
1See, for example, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001).
2See Table VIII in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and the discussion of the relationship
between S&P volatility and credit spreads in the benchmark results on p. 2709 in Cremers et al. (2008).
3Long-term debt has become especially important in the current ultra-low rate environment according
to observations in the Financial Times: "As developed world rates slide, leaving $13tn of bonds trading at
negative yields, investors led by insurers and pension funds are fanning out in search of income, encouraging
companies and governments to borrow at unprecedented maturities." (Moore, 2016).
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The present study relaxes this assumption using Merton’s (1969) model, which incorporates
investment decisions but does not consider long-term borrowing. In the extended model,
risk-averse agents (i) make investment and payout/consumption decisions as in Merton’s
model and (ii) can borrow and declare bankruptcy as in Leland’s model.4 ,5 This model, in
particular, predicts that, contrary to the general perception, credit spreads can be lower
when asset volatility is higher.
The general perception is that the credit spread increases with volatility because higher
asset volatility corresponds to a higher probability of default and associated losses. Essen-
tially, equity holders have a (put) option to default. The value of this option is higher when
volatility is higher. Accordingly, risky debt is the same as the combination of the corre-
sponding risk-free debt and a short position in the default option. Since the value of the
option increases with asset volatility, the value of the debt should be lower and the credit
spread should be higher when volatility is higher.
The above logic is correct in the context of models with static asset composition, but
it does not hold true if borrowers take into account the riskiness of projects when they
make investment decisions. If the composition of assets is determined by the borrower, the
4Several empirical papers show that firms’ investment and financial decisions are related to managers’
risk-aversion. See, for example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), and Graham,
Harvey, and Puri (2013).
5I use payout and consumption interchangeably (and together as “payout/consumption”), since in the
model, the firm’s payout corresponds to the consumption of the manager/owner who makes policy decisions.
Similarly, I use agent to refer to the firm together with the manager/owner and do not distinguish between
them before bankruptcy. I also use project and asset interchangeably, as investments in projects are assets
on the firm’s balance sheet.
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outcome can be very different. Wealthy,6 risk-averse borrowers act more conservatively when
volatility is higher: they choose safer projects to the extent that the total volatility of their
investment portfolio is lower. In addition, they reduce the outflow of funds (dividends in the
case of firms) when they face higher volatility of assets. The net effect of this behavior is a
lower probability of default, and therefore, lower credit spreads.
More conservative behavior in a riskier environment has been observed in various con-
texts. A salient example of this phenomenon is provided by Sweden. On September 3, 1967,
the traffi c in Sweden was switched from the left-hand side of the road to the right-hand side.
Since people did not have any experience driving on the right-hand side, an increase in the
number of car accidents should have been anticipated. On the contrary, the number of deaths
on the road decreased and was approximately two times lower than the usual level for several
weeks after the switch.7 Figure 1 shows the drop in the number of road accident deaths in
Sweden.8 ,9 This evidence indicates that a riskier environment can actually correspond to less
risk undertaken by agents. The present paper extends this idea to the investment decisions
of economic agents.
Several empirical papers have documented more conservative investment decisions of
6Wealthy firms are firms that have the total value of asset much higher than the amount of debt.
7This decrease resembles the Peltzman effect. Peltzman (1975) shows that drivers’behavior is riskier when
cars have protective devices required by the safety regulation, to the extent that "there is some evidence
that regulation may have increased the share of this [death] toll borne by pedestrians and increased the total
number of accidents" (p. 677).
8See Adams (1985), p.45.
9The outcome was similar when Iceland switched driving from the left-hand side to the right-hand side
of roads in 1968. See Wilde (1982) for references.
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Figure 1. Road Accident Deaths in Sweden. Source: Statistics Sweden. Adams (1985), p.45.
Sweden switched from left-side to right-side driving on September 3, 1967.
firms in more volatile environments. When volatility (measured using different approaches)
is higher, firms scale back risky investments, as shown, for example, in Leahy and Whited
(1996), Bulan (2005), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reen (2007), and Kellogg (2014). Moreover,
firms hold more safe assets when volatility is higher. In particular, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009) study cash holdings of US industrial companies and conclude that “cash ratios increase
because firms’cash flows become riskier”(p. 1985). In the most recent study, Alfaro, Bloom,
and Lin (2016) show that higher volatility causes firms to reduce real investments, increase
cash holdings, and cut dividends. In addition, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that managers
matter for the policy decisions of firms, and more recent studies show that managers’risk-
aversion is related to investment decisions (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012) and to corporate
financial policies (Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013). Bloom (2014) suggests that more
cautious corporate investment decisions, when uncertainty is high, may be explained by the
4
incentives of top executives.
The investment decisions of risk-averse economic agents can be examined in the context
of a simple two-period model. In this model, the agent has a constant absolute risk-aversion
utility function; she invests in the first and consumes in the second period. The invest-
ment choice of the agent consists of the risk-free and the normally distributed, risky asset.
The agent optimizes the expected utility. This optimization problem corresponds to the
return-variance trade-off: the expected excess return versus the variance of the investment
portfolio scaled by the risk-aversion coeffi cient. As the outcome of this trade-off, the optimal
investment rule corresponds to a lower volatility of the investment portfolio when the asset
volatility is higher. The reason is quite simple. Riskier investments are less attractive to the
risk-averse agent. Therefore, when the volatility of the risky asset is higher, the agent scales
back risky investments. Less risky investments mean lower expected excess returns. Accord-
ingly, the volatility of the optimal investment portfolio has to be lower, because otherwise
the return-variance balance would be violated.
A similar relationship between the volatility of the risky asset and the volatility of the
investment portfolio holds in the infinite-horizon Merton (1969) model, in which the agent
chooses the consumption rate and the allocation of wealth between risky and risk-free assets.
As in the two-period model, the optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset
is inversely proportional to the square of asset volatility. Accordingly, the volatility of the
investment portfolio is inversely proportional to asset volatility, and thus, decreases with
asset volatility. In addition, the consumption rate in the model also decreases with volatility
5
Figure 2. Corporate Balance Sheets. The figure shows the balance sheets of the company in
Leland’s (1994) and in the extended model presented in this paper.
(when the relative risk aversion (RRA) coeffi cient is greater than one as assumed hereafter).
To investigate the channel from asset volatility to credit spreads, the present study em-
ploys Merton’s (1969) investment portfolio allocation model to extend Leland’s (1994) capital
structure model as illustrated in Figure 2. In the extended model, borrowers make invest-
ment and payout decisions taking into account their wealth (the value of their assets). When
their wealth is high, the value of the option to default is low. Accordingly, the optimal in-
vestment and payout policies of wealthy borrowers are similar to optimal policies that avoid
bankruptcy: to invest a part of the wealth in the risk-free asset to service the debt and to use
the remaining wealth according to the optimal policies in Merton’s model. These policies
lead to a lower volatility of the investment portfolio when the volatility of risky assets is
higher. Additionally, the payout rate also decreases with volatility. The net result is a lower
probability of default, and therefore, a lower credit spread of high-quality debt when asset
volatility is higher.
The model predicts a negative relationship between asset volatility and credit spreads,
but asset volatility is diffi cult to observe. However, asset volatility affects stock volatility that
6
Figure 3. Volatility Channels. The figure illustrates how asset volatility affects credit spreads
and equity volatility in the model with endogenous asset composition.
can be observed on the market. To produce a testable implication, I examine the channel
from asset volatility to equity volatility. If it takes even an infinitesimal time to reallocate
resources to changes in asset volatility, then the instantaneous volatility of the investment
portfolio increases with asset volatility. Accordingly, equity volatility increases when the
volatility of the risky asset increases. Figure 3 illustrates the channels from asset volatility
to credit spreads and from asset volatility to equity volatility. The combination of these
channels produces a negative relationship between changes in equity volatility and credit
spreads. In a nutshell, equity volatility is driven by the volatility of the current investment
portfolio, whereas the credit spread depends on the volatility of investments during the
lifetime of the bond and thus is less sensitive to adjustment delays.
Some evidence indicating a negative relationship between stock volatility and credit
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spreads can be found in empirical papers, but remains unexplained in the finance litera-
ture. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) investigate the determinants of credit
spread changes, expecting a positive relationship, but their regression model, estimated us-
ing bond transaction data, has a negative coeffi cient on changes in volatility measured by
the VIX. Cremers et al. (2008) follow Campbell and Taksler (2003) using implied volatilities
and also expect a positive relationship, but encounter negative regression coeffi cients. These
negative coeffi cients remain unexplained.10 ,11 On the other hand, this evidence is consistent
with implications of the presented model with dynamic endogenous asset composition.
The empirical part of this paper examines the relationship between changes in market
volatility and credit spreads using the latest enhanced feed of the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine (TRACE) data that covers over-the-counter (OTC) bond transactions.
The results show that for high-quality (A rated and higher) long-term bonds,12 the relation-
ship between changes in market volatility and credit spreads (controlling for other variables)
is negative.13 This relationship is statistically and economically significant and robust to
10The negative relationship in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) is obtained using a relatively small sample of
29 bonds and has been ignored, probably, because of the lack of theoretical explanations although the result
is highly statistically significant. Cremers et al. (2008) acknowledge that the significant negative coeffi cient
on S&P volatility is diffi cult to explain.
11Note that some other empirical studies obtain positive regression coeffi cients using different bond sets,
sample periods, and regression specifications. For example, Campbell and Taksler (2003) find, in most
cases, a positive relationship between the standard deviation of daily stock index return and credit spreads.
However, in some cases, the relationship is insignificant or significantly negative (see Table V).
12Long-term debt allows for adjustment of asset composition that can be rigid in the short run. In the
long run, asset composition can be adjusted through asset depreciation and reinvestment of revenue. In the
short run asset disposition can be costly. In addition, as shown in Lamont (2000), implementing investment
decisions takes time.
13The control for other variables such as stock returns is important. The correlation between stock volatility
and credit spreads is positive. This positive correlation is induced, in particular, by changes in the value
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different sample splits. These results confirm the theoretical predictions.
The empirical part of the paper also shows that the relationship between changes in stock
volatility and credit spreads can have the opposite sign in distressed conditions when the
model assumptions are not satisfied. In the severely distressed market after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the relationship was positive. It is shown that mixing observations corre-
sponding to distressed and normal market conditions can produce misleading results. The
regression coeffi cient on changes in volatility can be positive if the sample includes observa-
tion corresponding to the period of distress; it becomes negative as soon as the regression
specification is corrected by interaction terms with the indicator of the distressed period.
This may explain a positive relationship between volatility and credit spreads obtained in
some empirical studies.
In addition to the negative relationship between changes in equity volatility and credit
spreads of long-term, high-quality debt, the model predicts that the regression coeffi cient is a
U-shaped function of the credit quality of bonds. The coeffi cient is negative for high-quality
debt. It decreases in absolute value and becomes positive for low-quality debt, because the
option to default becomes more valuable as the value of assets approaches the bankruptcy
threshold. The absolute value of the coeffi cient also decreases as the value of assets increases
to infinity, because the debt becomes essentially risk-free and thus insensitive to changes
in asset (and therefore, stock) volatility. This U-shaped relationship is corroborated in the
of assets: Lower values of assets correspond to higher stock volatility and higher credit spreads. Changes
in leverage or stock returns provide controls for changes in the value of assets. The negative relationship
between changes in volatility and credit spreads controlling for other variables can be explained by changes
in asset volatility as shown in the present paper.
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empirical part of the paper. The regression coeffi cient is negative and very significant for
A-rated bonds. For bonds rated A+ and higher, it is negative but smaller in absolute
value. The absolute value of the coeffi cient also declines as the bond rating declines toward
lower investment grades. For high-yield bonds rated from BB+ to B-, the coeffi cient is
positive. Thus, consistent with the model’s predictions, the regression coeffi cient becomes
more negative as the credit quality of bonds increases till some threshold (from high-yield
to A-rated) and becomes less negative thereafter.
1.1 Literature Review
The present paper is related to several intertwined strands in the corporate finance and
asset pricing literature. The proposed theoretical model incorporates the dynamic asset
composition derived from the literature on optimal portfolio allocation. In addition, this
model includes risky debt studied in the capital structure literature. The paper provides
a novel approach to structural credit models and explains several phenomena presented in
earlier studies. The empirical part of the paper is related to the credit literature, and in
particular, to papers that examine credit spreads of corporate bonds. The rest of this section
provides a brief review of these strands of literature.
The model in the present paper is founded on the dynamic portfolio allocation and
consumption model proposed by Merton (1969, 1971). A rigorous treatment of the optimal
portfolio allocation and consumption problem is provided in Karatzas et al. (1986) and in
later papers collected in Sethi (1997), which examine investment and consumption decisions
10
in the presence of bankruptcy at the zero-wealth level. Jeanblanc, Lakner, and Kadam (2004)
add continuous debt repayment to the model and find a closed-form solution for the optimal
default boundary. Following Magill and Constantinides (1976), several papers consider the
portfolio allocation problem with transaction costs. In the case of proportional transaction
cost, there is a non-trade region around Merton’s solution, as shown in Davis and Norman
(1990), Dumas and Luciano (1991), and Shreve and Soner (1994). Guasoni, Liu, and Muhle-
Karbe (2014) solve the optimal consumption and allocation problem for cash-flow generating
risky assets. Their results show that it may be optimal never to sell risky assets, but instead
to adjust the portfolio using generated cash, thus achieving the optimal asset composition
without costly asset disposition.
The asset composition of a company is considered in another strand of literature founded
on the work of Miller and Orr (1966), which investigates the dynamics of cash holdings
(which are similar to investments in the safe asset in the context of the present paper) and
risky investments generating stochastic cash flows. Hennessy and Whited (2005) develop
a dynamic model with endogenous choices of leverage, distributions, and real investment.
More recent studies extend the model and consider costly external financing. Recent notable
papers in this strand of literature include Decamps et al. (2011), Bolton, Chen, and Wang
(2011, 2014), Anderson and Carverhill (2012), Babenko and Tserlukevich (2013), Boot and
Vladimirov (2015), Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2014), and Bolton, Wang, and Yang
(2014). The main subject in this body of literature is corporate cash holdings that provide
a liquidity buffer in the presence of costly disposition of productive assets and expensive
11
external financing. The present paper also considers investments in the risk-free and risky
assets and extends the analysis to debt prices.
Another related strand of studies explores corporate capital structure, using Merton’s
(1974) analytical framework for valuing debt contracts. Black and Cox (1976) augment
this framework, in particular, with safety covenants and an endogenous default boundary.
Leland (1994) proposes a model that incorporates taxes and bankruptcy costs and obtains
the optimal capital structure. Leland (1998) combines capital structure and risky investment
decisions. Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) add a cash flow generating asset and dynamic
borrowing to the model.14 This framework is extended in subsequent papers. An extensive
review of the related literature is provided in Sundaresan (2013).15 The present paper is
particularly related to the study of Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) who consider borrowing
decisions of risk-averse agents. Among more recent publications, Sundaresan, Wang, and
Yang (2015) investigate dynamic investment, financing, and default decisions of a firm. Most
of the papers in this body of literature assume that investments are lumpy and irreversible
and that investors are risk neutral or suffi ciently diversified. The present paper relaxes
these assumptions and investigates implications of endogenous asset composition for equity
volatility and debt prices, using the approach considered in Chang and Sundaresan (2005).
A number of empirical papers examine the relationship between uncertainty measured
by asset volatility and corporate investment decisions. A review of the early literature is
14See Mauer and Triantis (1994) for an earlier dynamic model with endogenous investment and financing
decisions.
15See also Graham and Leary (2011) for a review of empirical studies.
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provided in Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley (2000). The general conclusion in that paper
is that higher uncertainty corresponds to lower capital expenditure. A similar conclusion
is obtained in several subsequent papers (Bulan, 2005, Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen,
2007, Stein and Stone, 2013, and Kellogg, 2014). Alfaro, Bloom, and Lin (2016) establish
a causal relationship: Higher volatility causes firms to reduce real investments, increase
cash holdings, and cut dividends. Most papers in this body of literature explain the lower
investment activity by a higher value of the real option in the case of higher uncertainty. The
present paper provides an alternative explanation for this phenomenon based on the risk-
aversion of economic agents. Such explanation is considered in Bloom (2014). In addition,
the present study extends the volatility-investment channel to debt prices, producing a novel
prediction that higher asset volatility can correspond to lower credit spreads (controlling for
other variables). This relationship produces predictions tested in the empirical part of the
paper.
The empirical part of the paper builds on studies that investigate the credit spread of
corporate bonds, and in particular, those that consider different factors that explain credit
spreads. Among these studies, Elton et al. (2001) explore components of credit spreads;
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) investigate determinants of credit spread
changes; Campbell and Taksler (2003) examine the effect of idiosyncratic equity volatility
on bond yields; Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) analyze the relationship between credit
spreads and credit default swaps (CDS); Driessen (2005) decomposes bond returns using
default, liquidity, and tax factors; Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) find that the majority
13
of the credit spread is related to default risk; Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) reveal that
liquidity is priced in credit spreads; Cremers et al. (2008) analyze the relationship between
firm volatility and credit spreads; and Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) use high-frequency stock
prices to explain the CDS premium. Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009) follow Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) to study determinants of CDS premiums; Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011)
find that liquidity becomes more important for credit spreads during the financial crisis,
Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) highlight the importance of the endogeneity
of cash holdings for credit spreads. The present study is closely related to Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001). That study encounters cases of a negative relationship between changes in
market volatility and credit spreads but leaves it unexplained. The present study analyzes
more recent bond transaction data and confirms that the relationship is indeed negative and
statistically and economically significant for long-term, high-quality debt. The present paper
provides new insight into the origins of this relationship and shows how the creditworthiness
of borrowers affects this relationship. In spirit, this paper is closer to results in Acharya,
Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) that "suggest that theoretical and empirical studies of
credit risk (and likely other areas of asset pricing) should account for endogeneity of corporate
financial and investment policies”(p. 3574).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model, which is
solved in Section 3. Section 4 considers the implications of debt financing for investment de-
cisions of economic agents and explains such phenomena as “flight to quality,”“gambling for
resurrection,”and “bankruptcy for profit.”Section 5 examines how investment and payout
14
decisions affect debt prices and, in particular, shows that higher asset volatility can corre-
spond to lower credit spreads. Section 6 establishes the relationship between asset volatility
and stock volatility. The relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit spreads
is tested using bond transaction data in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Model
This section presents a dynamic partial equilibrium model that synthesizes the capital struc-
ture model proposed in Leland (1994) and Merton’s (1969) portfolio allocation model. The
present model combines investment and payout/consumption decisions of economic agents
with risky borrowing. The model links endogenous asset composition to debt prices. The
economic agent in this model can be interpreted as an entrepreneur or a manager of a com-
pany who makes investment and payout decisions on behalf of the company, who is the equity
holder,16 and whose consumption is tied to the company.17 In this paper, terms “agent”,
“company”, and “firm”are used interchangeably, and “wealth”and “resources”mean the
total value of assets when the company is not bankrupt.
16Since the equityholders-managers agency problem is not considered in the paper, and due to homogeneity
of the utility function, all results hold true if the agent owns a portion of equities and receive the corresponding
portion of the payout stream.
17Straight forward extensions of the model can include additional constant income streams from a saving
account and/or salary (similar to wages in Merton, 1971). These income streams do not change conclusions
and are omitted to keep the model parsimonious.
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2.1 Investment Opportunities
As in Merton’s model, the investment opportunity set consists of the risk-free and the risky














where the drift, µ, and volatility, σ, are assumed to be positive constants, and Zt is a standard
Brownian motion.18 ,19 Parameters r, µ, and σ correspond to after tax dynamics.
2.2 Borrowing
Similar to Leland’s model, the agent establishes a company at time zero. The company is
funded by equity V E and debt D.20 The debt contract delivers amount D at time zero and
18The assumption of one risky asset is without loss of generality in the case of a constant opportunity
set. If there are risky assets with constant drifts and volatilities, then due to the mutual fund separation
theorem, the agent is indifferent between alternative 1, investing in risky assets and the risk-free asset, and
alternative 2, a portfolio of risky assets and the risk-free asset.
19Alternatively, assets can be specified as earning generating projects similar to Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001). Since asset composition and the payout rate can be freely adjusted in the current model, the process
for value of assets is specified directly to keep the model parsimonious.
20In this paper, I assume the given initial amount of equity. Similar results can be obtained if the total
amount of initial investments (debt plus equity) is fixed.
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requires the borrower to pay coupon rate c̄ per unit of time thereafter. Coupon payments
provide a tax shield on income. Thus, the effective payment rate for the borrower is c =
c̄ (1− τ), where τ is the tax rate.21 The company has the option to default on coupon
payments and declare bankruptcy. Once bankruptcy is declared, the agent is free from
debt but has lost some wealth and cannot raise risky debt after bankruptcy.22 If the value
of assets is VTB− right before bankruptcy at time TB, the agent retains αVTB− − K after
bankruptcy, and the share of the borrower’s assets seized by the lender is (1− α)VTB−.
Thus, the borrowing contract is described by (c̄, α,K,D), in which the proportion of split α
and the fixed dead-weight cost K imposed on the borrower represent the legal environment
and bargaining power in the case of bankruptcy and cannot be altered by the agent.23 ,24 The
amount of debt D is determined by the value of future coupon payments c̄. At time zero,
21More strictly speaking, since interest and equity incomes are subjects of taxation, τ corresponds to
Miller’s (1977) effective tax benefit of debt τ = 1− (1− τ c) (1− τe) / (1− τ i), where τ i is the tax on interest
income, τ c is the corporate income tax, and τe is the tax on equity income.
22I assume that the absolute priority rule is violated. As stated in Franks and Torous (1989) “It does
appear that deviation from absolute priority are rule rather than the exception”(p. 754). Similar conclusions
are made in a number of empirical papers that investigate restructuring in and out of bankruptcy courts. See,
for example, Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), Weiss (1990), Franks and Torous (1994), Betker (1995),
Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996). Some more recent papers (for example, Ayotte and Morrison, 2009
and Bris, Welch, and Zhu, 2006) argue that the violation of the absolute priority is not so severe during
1990s and 2000s (see Hotchkiss et al. 2008 for the discussion of the literature). It can be shown that the key
findings in the present paper hold if the absolute priority rule is satisfied, the debt has protective covenants
on the value of assets, and the agenent has an additional fixed income stream.
23The fixed cost increases the punishment for bankruptcy such that equityholders can be wiped out
completely. The fixed cost is also consistent with observations that the direct cost of restructuring exhibits
economies of scale in the case of bankruptcy (Warner, 1977 and Ang et al., 1982) and in the case of out-of-
court restructuring (Gilson, John, and Lang, 1990). Note that main results in the present papers are valid
when this cost is zero. In the presented model, the fixed cost is imposed on the borrower. Adding fixed cost
imposed on the creditor does not changes results and is omitted to keep the model parsimonious.
24Additional proportional deadweight cost does not change main results and is omitted to keep model
parsimonious.
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the agent chooses the coupon rate that corresponds to the optimal amount of debt for the
chosen amount of equity.
Denote PD (V0, c̄) the fair price of the debt contract that pays coupon rate c̄ and is issued
by the company with the total value of assets V0. This price is given by the risk-neutral
valuation









where EQ is the expectation taken under the risk-neutral measure and TB is the time of
bankruptcy.25 The first term in the square brackets corresponds to coupon payments before
bankruptcy, and the second term is the value recovered in the case of bankruptcy. Assuming
that the lending market is competitive, the amount raised by issuing debt equals the fair
price of the debt (i.e., the lender’s participation constraint is binding), and D satisfies the
following fixed point condition
PD
(
V E +D, c̄
)
= D. (4)
2.3 Dynamics of the Value of Assets
Denote Vt the total value of assets held by the company at time t. The initial value of assets
is equal to the initial equity plus debt,
V0 = V
E +D. (5)
25Hereafter, I use the convention e−rT
B
= 0 when TB =∞.
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The agent chooses proportion πt invested in the risky asset and invests the rest in the risk-
free asset. The agent also chooses the payout/consumption rate Ct. Additionally, before
bankruptcy, the agent pays effective coupon rate c on the debt. Therefore, the dynamics of
the total value of assets are given by
dVt = ((r (1− πt) + µπt)Vt − Ct − c) dt+ σπtVtdZt. (6)
In this equation, the drift terms correspond to the expected return on investments minus
payout to equity holders and coupon payments, and the volatility term is induced by invest-
ments in the risky asset. After bankruptcy, the agent makes investments,26 but there are no
coupon payments. Post bankruptcy, the total value of assets evolves according to
dVt = ((r (1− πt) + µπt)Vt − Ct) dt+ σπtVtdZt. (7)
2.4 Optimization Problem
Ex-post-borrowing, the agent chooses payout Ct, allocation πt, and bankruptcy time27 TB
to maximize the expected utility (given the initial capital V0 and debt coupon c̄). Therefore,
26To keep the model parsimonious, I assume the same opportunity set before and after bankruptcy.






the ex-post-borrowing indirect utility function is









subject to budget constraints (6) and (7), respectively, before and after bankruptcy, where





and u(C) is the utility function. In this
paper, I consider the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(C) = C
1−γ
1−γ
with γ > 1, although many subsequent results hold true in the case of general utility function
that is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable. The CRRA
utility function allows for an intuitive explanation of obtained results.
Ex-ante, the agent chooses coupon payments that maximize the indirect utility
U
(
V E +D, c̄
)
. Although, the agent also has the option to abstain from borrowing, the
borrowing participation constraint, U
(






, is automatically satisfied
for the optimal coupon c̄ ≥ 0 because the zero coupon rate corresponds to the zero debt.





V E +D, c̄
)
, (9)
subject to conditions (4) and (3) on the price of debt, where U is the ex-post-borrowing
indirect utility function given by (8).
In sum, the risk-averse agent maximizes the lifetime utility by borrowing at time zero
(described by the coupon payment rate and the corresponding amount of debt), strategically
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declaring bankruptcy, and making investment and payout/consumption decisions before and
after bankruptcy.
3 Solution
As is common in the real option theory, the model is solved backward in time. First, I
solve the stochastic control problem after bankruptcy. Next, for the given coupon c̄, I solve
the stochastic control problem with a free boundary before bankruptcy, using boundary
conditions imposed by the value function after bankruptcy. Finally, I solve for the optimal
coupon rate, using the value function and price of debt as functions of the coupon rate.
Note that due to the time homogeneity of the problem before and after bankruptcy, the
only state variable is the total value of assets Vt, and the optimal time to declare bankruptcy
corresponds to the first passage time
TB = inf
{
t : Vt ≤ V B
}
(10)
for some endogenously determined bankruptcy boundary V B. To simplify the notation, I
drop the time subscript where it does not produce ambiguity.
3.1 After Bankruptcy
After bankruptcy, there is no long-term debt, and the agent invests in the risk-free and risky
asset and chooses the consumption rate. Therefore, the problem is the classic Merton’s port-
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folio allocation problem. In this case, the value function, allocation ratio, and consumption
rate, respectively, are given by the following well-known formulas
UB (V ) = UM (V ) ≡ bV
1−γ
1− γ , (11)
π = −µ− r
σ2
UBV (V )


























Hereafter, I (·) is the inverse function of u′ (·), and subscripts V and V V denote, respectively,





is the same as the relative risk aversion in consumption, ξ = γ.
3.2 Avoiding Bankruptcy
After the debt has been raised and before bankruptcy, there are two cases that depend on the
debt burden and severity of the punishment for bankruptcy. In one case, bankruptcy occurs
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with some positive probability; in the other case, bankruptcy is avoided with certainty. This
subsection derives the solution for the case without bankruptcy; the following subsection
provides a necessary and suffi cient condition when bankruptcy is avoided; and the case with
bankruptcy is considered afterward.
First, note that if the wealth at any time is not high enough to service the debt forever,
Vt < c/r, then bankruptcy occurs with positive probability. See Appendix A for the formal
proof. Because zero payout/consumption rate is not feasible in the case of the CRRA utility
function, Vt = c/r also leads to bankruptcy (with positive probability); otherwise, the agent
can stay out of bankruptcy by investing in the risk-free asset and consuming nothing.
If the value of assets is higher than the price of the risk-free debt paying coupon c,
Vt > c/r, then the agent can allocate amount c/r to service the debt.28 To pay the coupon
rate forever, this amount can be invested in the risk-free asset. The remaining resources,
Vt−c/r, can be invested in the risky and risk-free assets and used for payouts to equityholders,
as in the case without debt. The maximal expected utility in the case without debt is
considered in the previous subsection. Thus, the maximal expected utility that can be
obtained without declaring bankruptcy, UNB (Vt; c̄), satisfies UNB (Vt; c̄) ≥ UM (Vt − c/r).
In addition, for any payout and investment policy (Ct, πt) that does not lead to bank-
ruptcy, Vt > c/r at any time t (as discussed, otherwise bankruptcy cannot be avoided with
certainty). Therefore, the allocation rule can be reformulated as follows: allocate amount c/r
28Note that c = (1− τ) c is not the coupon paid to lenders, and c/r is essentially the cost of the risk-free
debt. In this section, the price of the risk-free debt means the price of the risk-free debt paying coupon c,
that is c/r.
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to pay the coupon and split the rest of the resources, Vt−c/r, between the risky and risk-free
assets in proportions π̃t = πtVt/ (Vt − c/r) and (1− π̃t) = ((1− πt)Vt − c/r) / (Vt − c/r), re-
spectively. Since (Ct, π̃t) is a particular policy corresponding to the value of assets Vt − c/r,
the expected utility obtained following this policy cannot exceed the maximal expected util-
ity corresponding to Vt − c/r, that is, UM (Vt − c/r) ≥ UNB (Vt; c̄). Hence,
UNB (Vt; c̄) = U
M (Vt − c/r) . (16)
Accordingly, optimal investment and payout policies that avoid bankruptcy are29
πNB (V ; c̄) = −µ− r
σ2
UMV (V − c/r)








CNB (V ; c̄) = I
(
UMV (V − c/r)
)
= b−1/γ (V − c/r) . (18)
These policies correspond to the investment of c/r in the risk-free asset and the allocation
of the remaining resources as in Merton’s model without debt. The optimal investment and
payout policies that avoid bankruptcy will be utilized in later sections to explain the agent’s
behavior in the case with bankruptcy.
The left panel in Figure 4 shows the optimal payout and allocation policies that avoid
bankruptcy. In the case without bankruptcy, the payout ratio C/V is proportional to the
29These formulas can be derived directly as shown in Appendix B.
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Figure 4. Payout, Allocation, and Risk Aversion in the Case without Bankruptcy. The
figure shows payout and allocation policies that avoid bankruptcy and the corresponding relative
risk aversion in wealth. The left panel shows the payout ratio (the solid red line corresponding
to the left axis) that coincides with the allocation (the dashed green line corresponding to the
right axis). Axes are normalized so that Merton’s allocation corresponds to Merton’s payout ratio
shown with the horizontal dash-dotted line. The right panel shows the RRA in wealth (the thin solid
magenta line corresponding to the left axis) and the allocation (the dashed green line corresponding
to the right axis). Axes are normalized so that the allocation in Merton’s model (without debt)
corresponds to the RRA in consumption (the same as RRA in wealth in Merton’s model) shown
with the horizontal dash-dotted line. The cost of servicing debt forever c/r is shown in both panels
with the vertical dashed line.
allocation ratio π, following (17) and (18). So, lines corresponding to the payout and alloca-
tion ratios coincide in the figure. As the value of assets goes to infinity, these values converge
to corresponding values in Merton’s model without debt. Both ratios go to zero as the value
of assets decreases toward the cost of debt c/r.
The right panel shows the relative risk aversion in wealth and the optimal proportion of
resources allocated to the risky investments in the case without bankruptcy. The relative
risk aversion in wealth is inversely proportional to the allocation ratio. As the value of assets
increases, the relative risk aversion in wealth and the allocation converge to corresponding
values in Merton’s model. As the value of assets approaches the cost of debt c/r, the
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allocation ratio goes to zero, and the relative risk aversion in wealth goes to infinity.
Whether avoiding bankruptcy is optimal depends on the cost of carrying debt and the
severity of the punishment for bankruptcy. The cost of paying coupon rate c forever is
c/r. The punishment is more severe if the portion of wealth retained after bankruptcy, α,
is smaller, and/or the fixed cost, K, is larger. Thus, K/α measures the severity of the
punishment. Appendix A shows that it is optimal to avoid bankruptcy if and only if the
severity of punishment is higher than the cost of carrying debt forever,
K/α ≥ c/r.
Interestingly, this condition does not depend on any other parameters of the economy
and preferences. This solvency condition can be written as a constraint on the coupon rate.
Solvency Constraint on Debt Payments






As one can see, the firm’s debt is risk-free if and only if debt payments are suffi ciently low.
The limit on these payments is determined by the severity of the punishment for bankruptcy,
K/α, and the before-tax risk-free rate, r/ (1− τ). More severe punishment for bankruptcy
and higher risk-free rates correspond to higher possible risk-free coupon rates.
As shown in Appendix A, the solvency condition can also be stated in terms of the
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amount of debt.
Solvency Constraint on the Amount of Debt
There is no bankruptcy if and only if the amount of debt satisfies
D ≤ K
(1− τ)α. (20)
Hence, the firm’s debt is risk-free if and only if the amount of debt is suffi ciently small.
The limit is determined by the punishment for bankruptcy and the tax rate; it does not
depend on other parameters of the economy and preferences.
Thus, in an equilibrium without bankruptcies, debt repayments and the amount of bor-
rowing are limited respectively by (19) and (20). These limits are similar to endogenous
solvency constraints on debt that are considered a part of equilibrium conditions in Alvarez
and Jermann (2000, 2001).30 As in those papers, “these constraints ensure that agents will
not default, since they will never owe so much as to make them choose to default”(Alvarez
and Jermann, 2001, p. 117). These constraints are also “not too tight” in the sense that
they allow the highest possible risk-free lending and the agent will default in some states of
the economy if these constraints are violated.31
Note that if the solvency constraint (19) is satisfied, then the expected utility and op-
30These papers are based on the model proposed by Kehoe and Levine (1993) who consider analogous
solvency constraints. They also provide a justification for solvency constraints by showing that they can
emerge endogenously as equilibrium outcomes.
31Note that there are some differences in models, and, therefore, in constraints. Alvarez and Jermann
(2000, 2001) consider state-contingent borrowing, and their constraints are also state contingent. In this
paper, lending contracts and constraints are not state contingent.
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Figure 5. Value Function in Cases with and without Bankruptcy. The figure shows the
indirect utility functions. Both panels use the same notation. The dash-dotted line corresponds to
the utility function in Merton’s model without debt, UM (V ) = bV 1−γ
/
(1− γ). The dashed red line
corresponds to the indirect utility obtained by declaring bankruptcy, UB (V ) = UM (αV −K). Its
asymptotic line at K/α is shown by the vertical dashed line. The solid green line corresponds to the
maximal indirect utilities achieved with policies that avoid bankruptcy, UNB (V ) = UM (V − c/r).
Its asymptotic line at c/r is shown by the vertical dotted line. The left panel corresponds to the
case when the solvency constraint is satisfied, K/α > c/r. The solvency constraint is violated in
the case shown in the right panel.
timal investment and payout rules correspond to the ones that avoid bankruptcy and are
given by (16), (17), and (18), respectively. If the solvency constraint is violated, then bank-
ruptcy is possible. In this case, the expected utility values provided by (16) are attainable
but not maximal. Accordingly, investment and payout rules (17) and (18) are feasible but
not optimal. The next subsection provides the optimal solution for the case with possible
bankruptcy.
Figure 5 illustrates the solvency constraint using indirect utility functions. The left panel
shows the indirect utility of wealth in the case without bankruptcy, that is, when the debt
is risk-free. When the solvency constraint is satisfied, c/r ≤ K/α, the utility obtained by
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declaring bankruptcy is always below the utility that can be obtained without declaring
bankruptcy. Thus, it is never optimal to declare bankruptcy. The right panel in the figure
shows the case with bankruptcy. In this case, the solvency constraint is violated, c/r > K/α.
Due to the asymptotic behavior of the indirect utility functions, there is a region of values of
assets where the utility obtained by declaring bankruptcy is higher than the utility that can
be obtained by avoiding bankruptcy. Thus, it is not optimal to always avoid bankruptcy in
this case.
3.3 Possible Bankruptcy
This subsection considers the case when the bankruptcy boundary is attainable. This case
corresponds to c/r > K/α. In this case, there is the optimal default boundary V B. In
this section, I use the dynamic programming approach to find the solution for V > V B.
Appendix C provides calculation details.
The dynamics of the total value of assets before bankruptcy are given by equation (6).
This equation can be written as
dVt =
(
(r + λπt)Vt − C̃t
)
dt+ σtπtVtdZt, (21)
where λ = µ − r is the risk premium and C̃t = Ct + c combines the outflow terms. The
Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman (HJB) equation in terms of new variables is essentially the same
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The first-order conditions on investment π and payout C̃ are, respectively,






C̃ = Ĩ (UV ) , (24)
where Ĩ (·) is the inverse function of ũ′ (·). The substitution of these first-order conditions


















The value function must satisfy the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions when the





















where UB (V ) is the indirect utility function after bankruptcy.
Assuming that the solution is strictly concave (as is the case), the marginal utility of
wealth is a strictly decreasing function of wealth and v = − ln (UV (V )) is, accordingly,
a strictly increasing function of wealth. Therefore, one can consider the inverse function
V = V (v). This change of variables leads to a linear ODE that admits an analytical solution
proposed in Appendix C.32 The value function, the allocation ratio, the payout rate, and the
bankruptcy boundary are given, respectively, by equations (127), (128), (129), and (140) in
that appendix.
3.4 Price of Debt
As shown in Section 3.3, there are two possible cases corresponding to the risk-free and risky
debt. If c̄ ≤ rK/ ((1− τ)α), then the solvency constraint is satisfied, the debt is risk free,
and the price of debt is
PD (V, c̄) = c̄/r. (28)
32This change of variables is proposed by Presman and Sethi (1991) to solve Merton’s model. See also
Sethi et al. (1992) for the case with a non-zero consumption boundary.
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Let’s consider the case when the solvency constraint is violated. In this case, the price of
the debt is given by the risk-neutral valuation formula (3). This formula can be written as














is the expected present value of the unit payment in the case of
bankruptcy.
As noted in the previous subsection, because the marginal utility of wealth is a decreasing
function of wealth, v = − ln (UV (V ; c̄)) is an increasing function of wealth. Therefore, the
time of bankruptcy corresponds to the time of reaching the lower boundary vB:
TB = inf
{




t : vt ≤ vB
}
, (30)
where vB is determined by the smooth-pasting condition,













Appendix C shows that under the risk-neutral measure, the marginal utility of wealth
corresponding to optimal policies follows a geometric Brownian motion,33 and accordingly,
vt is a Brownian motion with drift,







where volatility σv = λ/σ, and the drift µQv = r − ψ − δ, where ψ = λ2/ (2σ2). Therefore,
TB is the first passage time of this Brownian motion with drift, corresponding to barrier
vB. The moment generating function (MGF) of the stopping time of the Brownian motion
with drift is provided in Appendix C. This MGF gives the expected present value of the unit























> 0. Thus, the price of the risky debt paying coupon
c̄ is













This formula has an intuitive explanation. The first term is the price of the risk-free
debt paying coupon c̄. The terms in square brackets correspond to the value received in the
case of bankruptcy minus the value lost. Since the marginal utility of wealth UV (V ; c̄) goes
to zero as the value of assets increases to infinity,34 the price of debt PD (V, c̄) converges to
the value of the risk-free debt, c̄/r, as the value of assets increases. As the value of assets
declines toward the bankruptcy threshold V B, the marginal utility UV (V ; c̄) converges to
34Because the indirect utility function is concave and bounded by UNB (V ) ≤ U (V ) ≤ UM (V ).
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Figure 6. Price of Debt and Amount of Borrowing. In both panels, the solid red line
shows the price of the debt as a function of the value of assets; the horizontal dash-dotted blue
line corresponds to the value of the risk-free debt, c̄/r, paying the same coupon rate as the risky
debt; and the black star corresponds to bankruptcy. The dotted blue line in the left panel shows
the recovery value in the case of bankruptcy, αW . The point where the recovery value is equal to
the price of debt is marked by the black cross. The dashed green line in the right panel shows the
borrowed amount for the corresponding initial value of assets V0. The intersection of this line and





due to the smooth-pasting condition, and the price of the debt approaches
the recovery value (1− α)V B, as expected. This behavior is illustrated in the left panel of
Figure 6, which shows the value of debt (for a fixed coupon rate) as a function of the value of
assets. Note that in a particular region close to bankruptcy, the price of debt is higher than
the recovery value. In this case, it is not optimal for lenders to enforce bankruptcy even if
they can do so. Accordingly, debt covenants corresponding to this region of values of assets
are irrelevant.









, where PB =
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present value of the unit payment in the case of bankruptcy. Note that Leland’s equation
34
(7) is written in terms of the value of the company’s assets, but equation (34) has marginal
utilities. This difference has an intuitive explanation. Leland (1994) considers the fixed asset
allocation. In that case, the value of assets follows a geometric Brownian motion process. In
the present case, allocation and payout are chosen endogenously. In this case, the marginal
utility is the geometric Brownian motion that determines the time of bankruptcy. Marginal
utilities seem natural in this context since the agents declare bankruptcy not because their
wealth is too low per se (the value of assets at the time of default is suffi cient to meet
current obligations), but because they expect to suffer so much by bearing debt payments
that bankruptcy is a good alternative, despite the associated punishment. The marginal
utility of payout/consumption (that is the same as the marginal utilities of wealth) provides
a measurement of agents’suffering.
3.5 Borrowing
The equilibrium amount of debt D = PD (V0, c̄) corresponds to the (highest) fixed point
given by equation (4). Appendix C shows that such a fixed point always exists. The agent
chooses the coupon rate c̄ that maximizes U
(
V E +D (c̄) , c̄
)
.
The right panel in Figure 6 shows the value of debt PD (V0, c̄) for a fixed coupon rate
as a function of the value of assets along with the amount of borrowing D corresponding to
the initial value of assets V0 = V E +D. The intersection of these lines gives the equilibrium
amount of borrowing PD(V E +D) = D.
When the solvency constraint is satisfied, c̄ ≤ rK/ (α (1− τ)), the debt is risk-free and
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PD = c̄/r. This price of debt corresponds to the utility value
U (V0) = U
M
((
V E + c̄/r
)




V E + c̄τ/r
)
.
Because UM (·) is an increasing function, the expected utility increases with the coupon
rate (assuming a non-zero tax rate). Therefore, the agent always borrows if K > 0, and
the coupon rate is at least c̄ = rK/ (α (1− τ)). This coupon rate corresponds to the
case when the solvency constraint is binding. The corresponding expected utility value is
UM
(
V E +Kτ/ (α (1− τ))
)
, which serves as a lower boundary for the expected utility value.
This lower boundary increases with the severity of punishment at bankruptcy K/α. This
happens because more severe punishment makes bankruptcy less attractive and, therefore,
supports higher risk-free coupon rates.











and the corresponding amount of debt as functions of the coupon rate. In the case of the
zero coupon rate, there is no debt and the relative certainty equivalent equals one. A higher




(marked by stars) corresponds to the highest coupon such
that the solvency constraint is satisfied: c̄ = rK/ ((1− τ)α). Up to this point, debt is risk
free, and the amount of borrowing, c̄/r, increases linearly with the coupon rate. Higher
values of the coupon rate correspond to risky debt. In this case, the amount of borrowing
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Figure 7. Amount of Borrowing and Its Certainty Equivalent. The solid blue line (corre-
sponding to the left axis) shows the relative certainty equivalent corresponding to the utility value
that is obtained with borrowing; the dashed green line (corresponding to the right axis) shows the
borrowed amount; and the dash-dotted line shows the price of the risk-free debt paying the same
coupon, c̄/r. The circle, stars, and cross marks correspond to no-borrowing, maximum risk-free
borrowing, and optimal borrowing, respectively.
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the coupon rate increases, debt becomes riskier, and the marginal amount of borrowing
decreases. At some point, the certainty equivalent and the corresponding utility value start
to decline with the coupon rate. This point (shown by cross marks) corresponds to the
optimal coupon value.
4 Implications of Debt Financing
This section considers three phenomena associated with economic agents’ investment and
payout decisions: flight to quality, gambling for resurrection, and bankruptcy for profit.
These phenomena arise endogenously in the presented model. The phenomena show how
debt financing affects borrowers’ investment and payout decisions as the value of assets
declines and approaches the bankruptcy threshold. Additionally, this section examines pay-
out/consumption changes in the case of bankruptcy.
4.1 Flight to Quality
The upper left panel in Figure 8 shows the allocation of wealth to the risky asset and the
relative risk aversion in wealth as functions of wealth. The RRA in wealth and the allocation
ratio are not constant, as in Merton’s model without debt. When the level of wealth is high,
risk aversion increases as wealth declines. In this case, the agent behaves more conservatively,
decreasing the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset and increasing the portion
invested in the risk-free asset, as the value of assets decreases. This shift from risky to safe
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Figure 8. Payout, Allocation, and Risk Aversion in the Case with Bankruptcy. The
figure shows optimal payout and allocation policies and RRA in wealth as functions of the value
of assets (scaled by the amount of debt). In all panels, the dash-dotted line shows the correspond-
ing values in Merton’s model, dotted lines correspond to policies that avoid bankruptcies (as in
Figure 4), black stars represent bankruptcy, and minimum and maximum points are marked by
black crosses. The upper left panel shows the allocation to the risky asset (the dashed green line
corresponding to the left axis) and the RRA in wealth (the thin solid magenta line corresponding
to the right axis). The upper right panel shows the payout ratio (the solid red line corresponding to
the left axis) and the RRA in wealth (the thin solid magenta line corresponding to the right axis).
The lower left panel shows the payout ratio (the solid red line corresponding to the left axis) and
the allocation to the risky asset (the dashed green line corresponding to the right axis). The lower
right panel shows the payout ratio before bankruptcy (solid red line) and the ratio of payout after
bankruptcy to the value of assets before bankruptcy (dashed red line). The thin black line in this
panel shows the decrease in the payout rate as the proportion of the value of assets at bankruptcy.
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assets (when adverse events negatively affect agents’wealth) is known as the flight to quality.
The dynamics described by the flight to quality emerge endogenously in the presented
model. The intuition behind this effect is as follows. When the agent’s wealth is high, the
value of the option to declare bankruptcy is low. In this case, the agent’s wealth allocation
is similar to the optimal investment policy that avoids bankruptcy. As shown in Section 3.2,
this investment policy is to allocate wealth to the risky asset proportionally to the amount
of wealth reduced by the cost of carrying debt forever,








This is an increasing function of wealth. Thus, the allocation of wealth to the risky asset
declines as wealth decreases.35
4.2 Gambling for Resurrection and Bankruptcy for Profit
The agent’s attitude toward risk and resulting investment patterns change as the value of
assets approaches the bankruptcy threshold. As shown in the upper left panel in Figure
8, when the agent’s wealth is below a certain point, the RRA in wealth decreases and the
proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset increases as wealth declines. This effect is
induced by the option to declare bankruptcy. The agent’s risk aversion declines as wealth
declines because the bankruptcy protection limits downside risk more when wealth is closer
35Note that even though the proportion allocated to the risky asset decreases as the total value of assets




to the bankruptcy threshold. The agent make more risky investments (gambling for resurrec-
tion) rationally anticipating that if the outcome is good, then the wealth can be restored; if
the outcome is bad, then creditors will absorb losses. This is the same risk-shifting behavior
of borrowers as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
A further decline in wealth leads to a higher payout rate as a proportion of wealth.
The upper right panel in Figure 8 illustrates these dynamics. As bankruptcy becomes more
and more imminent, payout (as a proportion of wealth) increases because the borrower
anticipates that, in the case of bankruptcy, debt holders will appropriate wealth that has not
been consumed. The borrower rationally increases the payout ratio as a proportion of wealth,
even though the higher payout rate makes bankruptcy more probable. Such bankruptcy for
profit behavior was exacerbated during the S&L crisis when owners essentially plundered
their companies, as discussed in Akerlof and Romer (1993).
The dynamics of the payout-to-wealth ratio are determined by the relationship between
the risk aversion in consumption and the risk aversion in wealth. The optimal payout rate
is given by the first-order condition
C = (UV )
−1/γ . (37)



















The term in the square brackets is positive. Thus, the payout-to-wealth ratio increases with
wealth when the relative risk aversion in wealth, ξ, is higher than the relative risk aversion






















When the wealth of agents dwindles, they scale back consumption proportionally more than
the decline in wealth if they are more risk averse in wealth than in consumption. In this case
the consumption to wealth ratio decreases as wealth declines.
At high levels of wealth, the RRA in wealth is approximately the same as in the case
without bankruptcy ξNB, which is higher than the RRA in consumption,









V − c/rγ > γ. (39)
Therefore, in this case, the payout-to-wealth ratio declines as wealth decreases. Close to the
bankruptcy threshold, the RRA in wealth is below the relative risk aversion in consumption.
In this case, the payout ratio increases as wealth declines. The minimum of the payout ratio
is achieved when the RRA in wealth is the same as the RRA in consumption, ξ = γ.
The minimum of the payout ratio (i.e., the turning point for bankruptcy for profit)
corresponds to a lower level of wealth than the minimum of the allocation ratio (the turning
point for gambling for resurrection). The reason is as follows. The minimum of the allocation
ratio corresponds to the maximum of the RRA in wealth because the allocation ratio and
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the RRA in wealth are inversely proportional. Therefore, the RRA in wealth is higher than
the RRA in consumption at that point. Accordingly, the payout ratio decreases as wealth
declines at the minimum of the allocation ratio. Therefore, the minimum of the payout
ratio occurs at a lower level of wealth than the minimum of the allocation ratio, that is,
the gambling for resurrection starts earlier (at a higher level of wealth) than bankruptcy for
profit. The payout ratio and the allocation to the risky asset are shown in the lower left
panel of Figure 8.
4.3 Strategic Bankruptcy
Even though bankruptcy is declared optimally in the model, it is associated with a drop
in consumption. To see that this is the case, note that, by the smooth-pasting condition,
the marginal utility of wealth right before bankruptcy equals the derivative of the value




. This value is less than the marginal utility of




since α < 1. Because the marginal utility
of wealth equals the marginal utility of consumption, the marginal utility of consumption
right before bankruptcy is lower than the marginal utility right after. By the concavity of the
utility function, the marginal utility of consumption is a decreasing function of consumption.
Therefore, consumption immediately prior to bankruptcy is higher than consumption right
after, even though bankruptcy is chosen optimally. In the case of the CRRA utility function,
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the consumption rate right before and right after bankruptcy can be written as,
Cbefore = (αb)
−1/γ (αV B −K) > b−1/γ (αV B −K) = Cafter.
Accordingly, the ratio of the consumption rate before and after bankruptcy is α−1/γ > 1.
This observation is relevant to the possibility of defaults. The argument that the borrower
will not default because the consequences of a default lead to immediate suffering is not
valid in general. It can be optimal for the borrower to declare bankruptcy, even though
the immediate outcome is lower consumption, because bankruptcy prevents the depletion of
wealth caused by servicing debt obligations.
The lower right panel in Figure 8 illustrates the decrease in consumption in the case of
bankruptcy. The solid red line shows the consumption-to-wealth ratio before bankruptcy,
and the dashed red line shows the ratio of consumption after bankruptcy to the wealth
right before bankruptcy, b−1/γ (αV −K) /V . In the considered case of α = 0.25 and γ = 2,
the consumption rate before bankruptcy is twice as high as the consumption rate after
bankruptcy.
In summary, the flight to quality, gambling for resurrection, and bankruptcy for profit
describe the sequence of actions of economic agents when wealth deteriorates toward bank-
ruptcy. First, when agents are far from bankruptcy, they reduce payout and risky investments
(as a proportion of wealth) as their wealth declines. Then, as their wealth decreases further,
they start to increase risky investments, but still reduce their payout ratio. After that, as
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their condition deteriorates further, they start to pay out/consume (proportionally) more
and make more risky investment bets. Finally, when their wealth reaches the bankruptcy
threshold, they declare bankruptcy associated with a drop in consumption.
5 Asset Volatility and Debt Prices
This section considers some implications of endogenous investment and payout decisions of
borrowers for debt prices. It shows that, contrary to common beliefs, credit spreads can
be lower when asset volatility is higher. The finance literature and the general perception
consonantly suggest that higher volatility corresponds to wider credit spreads. The logic
behind this suggestion is as follows. Higher asset volatility corresponds to a higher probability
of default and associated losses. Therefore, the value of the debt is lower, and the credit
spread is higher when asset volatility is higher. Basically, borrowers have a long position
in the put option to default, and debt holders have the corresponding short position in this
option. Since the value of the option increases with volatility, the value of the debt contract
is lower when asset volatility is higher.
This rationale is valid if investments are fixed, and the borrower cannot adjust the compo-
sition of assets, but it may become invalid if the assumption of unchangeable asset allocation
is relaxed. The outcome can be entirely different if the borrower can choose the composition
of assets. Figure 9 shows debt prices as functions of wealth for different values of asset
volatility. As one can see, when the value of assets is high, higher volatility corresponds
to higher prices and accordingly to lower credit spreads. To explain this effect, this section
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Figure 9. Sensitivity of Debt Prices to Asset Volatility. The figure shows the price (scaled
by the amount of debt) of the same debt contract as functions of the value of assets (scaled by the
amount of debt) for different values of asset volatility. The solid blue, dashed green, and dotted
red lines correspond to volatility values of 15, 20, and 30 percent, respectively. Stars correspond to
bankruptcies. For the value of assets below the bankruptcy threshold, the debt price corresponds
to the recovery value.
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investigates the relationship between the volatility of the risky asset and the volatility of the
investment portfolio. First, this section considers a simple two-period model without debt.
Next, it analyzes Merton’s (1969) model. After that, it extends intuition to the model with
debt. Finally, it examines the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatility.
5.1 Two-Period Model
Consider a two-period investment problem of the agent with a constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function,
u (C) = 1− e−γC . (40)
The agent has initial wealth W0, invests at time zero, and consumes the proceeds at the
next period. The opportunity set consists of the risk-free and risky asset. The risk-free asset
grows at a constant rate r, and the return on the risky asset is normally distributed with
mean µ and volatility σ.
Denote π the proportion of wealth allocated to the risky asset. The second period wealth
is given by
W1 = πW0 (1 + µ+ σZ) + (1− π)W0 (1 + r) = [1 + r + π (µ− r)]W0 + πW0σZ, (41)
and the expected utility is
















Note that πW0 (µ− r) is the expected excess return, and π2W 20σ2 is the variance of the
return. Thus, the agent evaluates the variance-return trade-off: the expected excess re-






Hence, the allocation to the risky asset is inversely proportional to σ2 and, as expected,
decreases with the volatility of the risky asset. What is more, a higher volatility of the risky





This relationship has an intuitive explanation. Riskier investments are less attractive to the
risk-averse agent if they do not provide higher risk premium. Therefore, the agent scales
back risky investments when the volatility of the risky asset is higher. In this case, the
36Here and in the following sections all other modal parameters are kept constant. Note that, in this
case, the risk premium is constant. Keeping the risk premium constant is consistent with empirical studies
that investigate changes in credit spreads and run the regression of the changes in credit spreads on changes
in volatility controlling for market excess returns (or market returns and risk-free rates) and some other
variables.
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variance of the investment portfolio cannot be higher because the return-variance balance
would be violated since less risky investments mean lower expected excess returns. By the
same reason, the volatility of the investment portfolio cannot be the same. Thus, a higher
volatility of the risky asset corresponds to a lower volatility of the investment portfolio.
This result also holds in the context of the Merton (1969) model considered in the following
section.
5.2 Merton’s Model
In Merton’s model, the risk-averse agents choose their consumption and allocation of wealth
between the risk-free and risky asset. The optimal proportion of wealth allocated to the risky
asset is inversely proportional to the square of the volatility value as in the model considered














is inversely proportional to asset volatility, and thus decreases as asset volatility increases.
The rationale behind this effect is also the same as in the previous section: more volatile
assets are less attractive to the risk-averse agent, thus the agent invests less in risky assets
when volatility is higher. The question is how much less. The same volatility of the portfolio
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of more volatile assets corresponds to a lower expected return. In Merton’s model, the agent
is not willing to take the same risk (measured by volatility) with a lower expected return,
and scales back risky investments so much that the volatility of the portfolio is lower.














Thus, higher volatility corresponds to a lower consumption rate (assuming that γ > 1).
This lower consumption rate can be explained by a lower expected return on the investment
portfolio. To show that this is the case, let’s further examine the optimal consumption-to-
wealth ratio in Merton’s model.
As shown in Appendix B, the optimal consumption-to-wealth ratio for a given constant





δ + (γ − 1)
[
r + (µ− r) π − 1
2
γ (µ− r) (σπ)2
]}
. (49)
This formula has an intuitive interpretation. The first term in the curly brackets corresponds
to the agent’s impatience; higher impatience corresponds to a higher consumption rate.
In addition to impatience, there are three terms in the square brackets. The first term
corresponds to the risk-free returns; higher returns correspond to a higher consumption
rate.37 The second term corresponds to the excess return on the portfolio; a higher expected
37Assuming that γ > 1, that is the income effect prevails over the substitution effect.
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return corresponds to a higher consumption rate. The third term is the precautionary saving
that is proportional to the variance of the portfolio; higher portfolio volatility corresponds
to a lower consumption rate ceteris paribus.
In the case of the optimal allocation policy (46), the expression for the consumption-to-




















The second and third terms in square brackets are the only terms that depend on volatility.
The second term corresponds to the excess returns on the investment portfolio, and the third
term corresponds to precautionary saving. Both terms are inversely related to volatility, but
the excess return term dominates the precautionary saving term because it is twice as large.
This determines the relationship between the consumption rate and asset volatility: higher
volatility corresponds to a lower consumption rate. Note that the precautionary saving term
increases consumption when asset volatility increases because the precautionary saving effect
depends on the total volatility of the portfolio, which is lower when asset volatility is higher.
5.3 Model with Debt
In the model with debt, relationships between asset volatility and optimal (pay-
out/consumption and investment) policies that avoid bankruptcy are similar to the ones
in Merton’s model. As shown, the optimal allocation policy that avoids bankruptcy is to
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invest a portion of wealth in the risk-free asset to service the debt and to allocate the re-
maining wealth according to Merton’s rule. Accordingly, the amount of wealth allocated to
the risky asset is
πNBt Vt = π





(Vt − c/r) . (51)











and thus decreases with asset volatility. The intuition is the same as in the case of Merton’s
model without debt.
The optimal payout rate corresponding to policies that avoid bankruptcy is given by (18)
and can be written as
CNBt = θ












(Vt − c/r) . (53)
Thus, the payout rate declines when asset volatility increases. This formula also has the
same interpretation as in the case of Merton’s model.
When the value of assets is high, optimal policies in the model with debt are similar
to policies that avoid bankruptcy, as discussed above and shown in the lower left panel of
Figure 8. Therefore, higher volatility of the risky asset is associated with lower volatility of
the investment portfolio and a lower payout rate. The net effect of higher asset volatility
is a lower probability of default, a higher price of debt, and a lower credit spread of the
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wealthy borrower. This effect is opposite to the relationship between volatility and credit
spreads in Leland’s (1994) model (see Table I on page 1224 in that paper). In that model
investments cannot be adjusted, and, accordingly, the value of debt declines and the credit
spread increases with volatility when the value of assets is high.
When the value of assets is low, the relationship between asset volatility and credit spreads
is the opposite of the one when the value of assets is high. In the vicinity of bankruptcy,
higher volatility is associated with higher credit spreads. This is again the opposite of the
relationship in Leland’s model. In that model, higher volatility increases the value of the
default option. As a result, the agent/firm declare bankruptcy at a lower level of the value
of assets. In the present model, the agent chooses to declare bankruptcy earlier (at a higher
level of the value of assets) when volatility is higher. This can be partially explained by a
lower value of the default option due to a lower volatility of the investment portfolio when
the value of assets rebounds to a higher level.
Figure 10 shows the allocation of resources to the risky asset, portfolio volatility, payout
ratio, and the twenty-year probability of default as functions of the value of assets for different
volatility values. As shown, when the value of assets is high, higher volatility corresponds
to a lower allocation to the risky asset, and accordingly, to lower portfolio volatility. Along
with a lower payout ratio, this leads to a lower probability of default, and consequently, to a
higher value of debt. At the same time, higher volatility corresponds to earlier bankruptcy.
When the value of assets is low, portfolio volatility and the probability of default are higher,
and the price of debt is lower if volatility is higher.
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Figure 10. Asset Volatility and Probability of Default. The figure shows the optimal
proportion allocated to the risky asset, the investment portfolio volatility, the optimal payout
ratio, and twenty-year (risk-neutral) default probability as functions of the value of assets (scaled
by the amount of debt) for different values of risky asset volatility. The solid blue, dashed green,
and dotted red lines correspond to volatility values of 15, 20, and 30 percent, respectively. Stars
correspond to bankruptcies.
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Figure 11. Sensitivities of Debt Prices and Credit Spreads to Asset Volatility. The
left and right panels show, correspondingly, sensitivities of debt prices and credit spreads (basis
points) to changes in asset volatility (percentage points) as functions of the value of assets (scaled
by the amount of debt). In each panel, the vertical dashed black line corresponds to the bankruptcy
threshold, and the horizontal dash-dotted line is the asymptote.
5.4 Sensitivity of Credit Spreads to Asset Volatility
The left panel in Figure 11 shows the sensitivity of debt prices to asset volatility. As ex-
plained, the sensitivity is positive when the value of assets is high. The sensitivity decreases
and becomes negative as the value of assets declines toward the bankruptcy threshold. This
effect can be attributed to the default option (as in Merton 1974): the put option to default
becomes more valuable when the company approaches bankruptcy. The negative relation-
ship between volatility and debt prices (the positive relationship between volatility and
credit spreads) is common for most capital structure models. As one can see, in the cases
of endogenous asset composition, this relationship holds only when the company is close to
bankruptcy.
The sensitivity of debt prices to asset volatility also declines with the increase in the value
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of assets above some level. This effect also has an intuitive explanation. As the value of
assets increases further and further, the probability of bankruptcy declines toward zero, and
the price of the risky debt approaches the price of the risk-free debt with the same coupon.
Since the price of the risk-free debt does not depend on asset volatility, the sensitivity of the
risky debt to asset volatility converges to zero as the value of assets goes to infinity.
The credit spread of the risky debt with infinite maturity can be calculated as
CS = c̄/PD − r. (54)
The right panel in Figure 11 shows the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatility. This
relationship is opposite to the sensitivity of debt prices to asset volatility and has a U-shaped
form. The sensitivity decreases and becomes negative as the value of asset increases to a
certain level and increases toward zero (declines in absolute values) afterward. As shown
in the following section, the sensitivity of credit spreads to equity volatility inherits this
U-shaped relationship.
6 Asset Volatility and Equity Volatility
This section considers equity volatility and its relationship to asset volatility. The theo-
retical relationship between credit spreads and equity volatility is obtained by combining
sensitivities of credit spreads and equity volatility to asset volatility. This relationship is
corroborated in the empirical part of the paper.
56
6.1 Price of Equity
Section 3.3 shows that there are two possible cases: in one case, the debt is risk free, and
there is no bankruptcy; in the other case, the debt is risky, and bankruptcy is possible. In
the first case, the fair value of equity is given by the total value of assets minus the cost of
carrying debt forever,
PE (V ; c̄) = V − (1− τ) c̄
r
. (55)
In the second case, the price of equity has to be adjusted by the cost of bankruptcy,








(1− α)V B +K
)]
PB, (56)
where, PB, is the expected discounted value of unit payment at bankruptcy given by (33).
This formula is similar to expression (13) for the price of equity in Leland (1994). The
difference is the loss in the case of bankruptcy:
(
(1− α)V B +K
)
instead of V B.38
The left panel in Figure 12 shows the price of equity as a function of the value of assets.
The price of equity approaches the price of equity in the case without bankruptcy given by
(55) as the value of assets increases. It declines towards the retained value, αV −K, as the
value of assets approaches the bankruptcy threshold.
38Of course, formulas for the present value of the expected discounted value of unit payment at bankruptcy
are different as explained in Section 3.
57
Figure 12. Price of Equity and Its Volatility. The figure shows the price and volatility of
equity as functions of the value of assets (scaled by the amount of debt). The solid red line in the
left panel corresponds to the price of equity; the dash-dotted blue line corresponds to the value of
equity in the company that avoids bankruptcy, V −c/r; and the dotted blue line corresponds to the
retained value in the case of bankruptcy, aV −K. The solid red line in the right panel corresponds
to the values of equity volatility. The dash-dotted blue line corresponds to the volatility of Merton’s
investment portfolio, πMσ. Stars correspond to bankruptcy.
6.2 Equity Volatility

















where µVt and σ
V
t are the drift and volatility of the total value of assets in equation (6).
From this expression, the equity volatility can be written as the product of the elasticity of

















The right panel in Figure 12 shows the equity volatility as a function of the value of
assets. When the value of assets declines towards the bankruptcy threshold, the price of
equity approaches the value retained in the case of bankruptcy. As the value of assets
increases, the price of equity approaches the value of assets reduced by the cost of carrying
debt forever, V −c/r, that is the equity price of the company that implements investment and
payout policies that avoid bankruptcy. Accordingly, the elasticity of the equity to the value
of assets approaches V/ (V − c/r) as the value of assets increases. As previously discussed,
when the value of assets is high, the optimal allocation policy is similar to the policy that
avoids bankruptcy, π ≈ πM (V − c/r) /V . Thus, when the value of assets is high, equity
volatility is approximately πMσ as can be seen in the right panel of Figure 12.
6.3 Sensitivity of Credit Spreads to Equity Volatility
This subsection examines the sensitivity of stock volatility to changes in asset volatility. To
make the notation clear, the volatility of the risky asset is explicitly specified as a parameter.
Consider an unanticipated change in the risky asset volatility from σ = σ1 to σ = σ2. As
shown in the previous section, the initial equity volatility can be written as







π (V ;σ1)σ1. (59)
If the company can adjust its investments instantaneously, then the equity volatility after
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the changes in asset volatility is







π (V ;σ2)σ2. (60)
As discussed, when the value of assets is high, the elasticity of the equity price to the
value of assets is approximately V/ (V − c/r) and the optimal allocation is approximately
πM (V − c/r) /V . Therefore, the change in equity volatility is










Thus, when value of assets is high, equity volatility decreases with asset volatility if the
company can adjust investments instantaneously.
Now, suppose that it takes infinitesimal time interval ∆t to adjust the allocation of
resources between the risky and risk-free investments in response to changes in asset volatility.
Denote PE (V ;σ1, σ2) and σE (V ;σ1, σ2), correspondingly, the price of equity and equity
volatility after the change in the risky asset volatility from σ1 to σ2. By the continuity of
the price of equity as a function of the value of assets, as ∆t → 0, the price of equity after
the change in asset volatility converge to the price of equity corresponding to the new value
of asset volatility, PE (V ;σ1, σ2)→ PE (V ;σ2), and therefore,







π (V ;σ1)σ2. (62)
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As before, when the value of assets is high, the elasticity of the price of equity is approx-
imately V/ (V − c/r), and the allocation is approximately πM (V − c/r) /V . Therefore, in
the limit, the change in equity volatility is
σE (V ;σ1, σ2)− σE (V ;σ1) ≈ πM1 σ2 − πM1 σ1 = πM1 ∆σ. (63)
where πM1 = (µ− r) / (γσ21) is the Merton allocation corresponding to the original asset
volatility and ∆σ is the change in asset volatility. Thus, the equity volatility increases with
the volatility of the risky investments if the company cannot adjust investments instanta-
neously. This positive relationship is shown in Figure 13 that depicts the instantaneous
equity volatility before and after the change in asset volatility. As one can see the change
from the initial volatility of 15 percent to a higher volatility of assets (to 20 or to 30 percent)
corresponds to a higher equity volatility. The figure also shows that the changes in equity
volatility can be approximated by equation (63) when the value of assets is high relative to
the amount of debt.
The left panel in Figure 14 shows the sensitivity of equity volatility to the volatility
of the risky asset. It is positive and, consistent with the approximation (63), approaches
the asymptotic line corresponding to πM = (µ− r) / (γσ2) as the value of assets goes to
infinity. The right panel in Figure 14 shows the sensitivity of credit spreads to equity
volatility obtained by combining the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatility and the
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Figure 13. Changes in Asset Volatility and Equity Volatility. The figure shows equity
volatility corresponding to changes in asset volatility as functions of the value of assets (scaled
by the amount of debt). The solid blue line corresponds to the initial values of equity volatility
corresponding to σ1 = 0.15. Dashed green and dotted red lines shows the new values of equity
volatilities (corresponding to σ2 = 0.2 and 0.3). Corresponding thin dash-dotted lines show the
approximated values, σ1 +
µ−r
γσ21
(σ2 − σ1). Stars correspond to bankruptcy.
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Figure 14. Sensitivity of Credit Spreads to Equity Volatility. The left and right pan-
els show, correspondingly, the sensitivity of equity volatility (percentage points) to asset volatility
(percentage points) and the sensitivity of credit spreads (basis points) to equity volatility (percent-
age points) as functions of the value of assets (scaled by the amount of debt). In each panel, the
vertical dashed black line corresponds to the bankruptcy threshold, and the horizontal dash-dotted





sensitivity of equity volatility to asset volatility.39 As one can see the sensitivity is a U-
shaped function of the total value of assets. The sensitivity is positive when the company
is close to bankruptcy, but it becomes negative as the value of assets increases. When the
sensitivity is negative, it initially increases in absolute value with the value of assets. It
declines in absolute value after a certain level of the value of assets because very high values
of assets correspond to essentially risk-free debt. This U-shaped relationship is essentially
inherited from the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatility shown in the right panel of








39Note that, by the continuity of debt prices, the established relationship between asset volatility and debt
prices holds in the limiting case when the adjustment time goes to zero.
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Note that the negative sensitivity of credit spreads to equity volatility, in particular,
driven by the different response of the long-term debt and equity of wealthy companies to
changes in asset volatility. Roughly speaking, the equity volatility is sensitive to short-term
asset volatility, but debt prices are driven by the bond’s lifetime volatility of the firm’s assets.
6.4 Regression of Credit Spreads on Equity Volatility
In the case of the delayed allocation adjustments, there are two events corresponding to
changes in asset volatility. First, asset volatility changes but the allocation of resources
stays the same. Second, the firm adjusts their asset composition. Sensitivities of credit
spreads and equity volatility to asset volatility considered in the previous section correspond
to the first event. When the firm adjusts their asset composition, the total asset volatility
and, accordingly, equity volatility changes again. Appendix D considers the OLS regression
of changes in credit spreads on changes in equity volatility corresponding to these two events.
It is shown that in the limit when the adjustment delay approaches zero, the slope coeffi cient





where ∆s is the change in credit spreads and ∆1σE and ∆2σE are changes in equity volatil-
ity corresponding, respectively, to the change in asset volatility and to the change in the
allocation policy.
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When the value of assets is high relative to the amount of debt, ∆1σE ≈ πM1 ∆σ and
∆2σ
E ≈ σ2∆πM , where ∆σ is the change in asset volatility and ∆πM is the difference in
Merton’s allocations corresponding to the original and new asset volatility. In this case,
β ≈ σ2






Thus, the slope coeffi cient is proportional to the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatil-
ity, and therefore, the slope has the same sign as the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset
volatility. Hence, a high value of assets corresponds to a negative slope coeffi cient when the
value of assets is high. This negative relationship is illustrated in Figure 15.
Figure 15 shows the slope coeffi cient of the OLS regression line calculated using equation
(64) as a function of credit spreads. The slope is positive for high yield debt and negative
for debt with credit spreads below some level. It approaches zero as the credit spread
decreases to zero. This U-shaped relationship is analogous to the U-shaped relationship of
the sensitivity of credit spreads to asset volatility. The empirical part of the paper shows
a similar relationship between credit spreads of long-term debt and stock volatility. The
regression coeffi cient of changes in credit spreads on changes in stock market volatility is
positive for high-yield bonds and negative for investment grade bonds. The highest absolute
value of the regression coeffi cient corresponds to A-rated bonds. Bonds rated A+ or higher
and bonds with credit ratings below A have lower absolute values of the regression coeffi cient
than A-rated bonds.
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Figure 15. Regression Coeffi cient on Changes in Equity Volatility. The figure shows the
slope coeffi cient as a function of credit spreads for the OLS regression of changes in credit spreads
on changes in equity volatility. The solid red and dashed green lines correspond, respectively, to
infinitesimal and finite (±5%) changes in asset volatility. The regression lines correspond to two
events in the model: changes in asset volatility keeping allocation constant and the adjustment of
the allocation to the new value of asset volatility. Changes in credit spreads are measured in basis
points, and changes in equity volatility are measured in percentage points.
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7 Empirical Analysis
The empirical part of the paper examines the predicted negative relationship between stock
volatility and credit spreads of corporate bonds. The regression analysis in this section
utilizes a comprehensive set of bond transaction data to estimate the relationship. The
regression results show that the relationship between changes in stock market volatility and
credit spreads measured by the corresponding regression coeffi cient is indeed negative for
long-term, high-quality bonds. Moreover, it shows that the value of the coeffi cient is a U-
shaped function of the credit quality of bonds, as predicted in the theoretical part of the
paper.
The dependent variable in the base regression analysis provided in this section is the
change in the credit spreads of long-term, high-quality bonds. The theoretical part of the
paper predicts a negative relationship between stock volatility and credit spreads when the
borrower’s wealth is high, that is, the borrower is far from the bankruptcy threshold. This
high level of wealth corresponds to high-quality (i.e., high credit rating) bonds. The choice
of long-term debt can be explained as follows. One of the assumptions in the presented
model is the possibility of the reallocation of resources between risky and risk-free assets.
In reality, a quick disposition of assets can be costly, and the optimal strategy could be to
reinvest earnings into less risky assets or projects when volatility increases.40 If this is the
case, the reallocation of resources can take time, and the adjustment of investments is more
problematic in the short term. Accordingly, the credit spread of long-term and short-term
40See Guasoni et al. (2014) for a justification of this policy.
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debt can have different relationships with volatility.
The main explanatory variable of interest is the change in stock market volatility. Stock
volatility is considered in several papers in the literature that investigates the relationship
between uncertainty about future outcomes and corporate investments.41 In the base case, I
use the Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index VIX as the aggregate measure
of stock market volatility, as in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001).42 The obtained results cor-
roborate the negative relationship between volatility and credit spreads encountered in that
paper.
7.1 Data
To test the predicted relationship between volatility and credit spreads, I use the set of
factors proposed in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and often considered in the credit literature
as determinants of changes in credit spreads. This set consists of returns on the stock market
index and changes in the following variables: the level of spot rates, the slope of the yield
curve, firms’leverage, market volatility, and market volatility smirk. I use these factors to
explain changes in the credit spreads of long-term, high-quality corporate bonds.
To construct these variables, I use four main sources of panel data. The Trade Reporting
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) data covers OTC bond transactions including bond prices
41See, for example, Pindyck (1988), Leahy and Whited (1996), Bulan (2005), Bloom, Bond, and Van
Reenen (2007), Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2008, 2010).
42The VIX index has several advantages. The theoretical model considers instantaneous volatility, and the
VIX measures short-term, thirty-day, volatility. Additionally, the calculation of the VIX does not assume
the lognormal distribution of stock returns (see Demeterfi et al., 1999 for details).
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and corresponding yields. All broker-dealers registered with the Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority (FINRA) are required to report corporate bond transactions using TRACE.
The enhanced dataset contains reported transactions from the inception of TRACE in July
2002. The present research uses the available time span of the data, from 07/01/2002 to
12/31/2012. The second set of data is the Mergent Fixed Income Security Database (FISD),
which contains an extensive set of characteristics of publicly offered bonds and provides
historical records of credit ratings assigned to bonds by the main credit rating agencies.
The third dataset is Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Compustat North America database, which
includes fundamental information on public companies. I use this database to obtain ac-
counting data related to bond issuers. The fourth dataset is the stock data provided by the
Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP database is used to calculate
stock returns and market capitalizations.
Additionally, I use the following time series: S&P 500 and S&P 100 indexes provided in
the Compustat database; constant maturity Treasury yields from the Federal Reserve Board
H.15 report; the CBOE volatility indexes VIX and VXO; and the volatility surface of S&P
500 options provided by OptionMetrics.
7.2 Cleaning and Merging
This subsection describes the data cleaning procedure of the TRACE bond transaction data
and the merging of the cleaned data with the FISD, CRSP, and Compustat datasets. Details
of the procedure are provided in Appendix E. The resulting dataset is used for regression
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analysis in the following subsections.
In the present study, I consider fixed-coupon, dollar-denominated senior corporate deben-
tures and medium-term notes issued by nonfinancial US companies. To be included in the
sample, bonds have to be noncallable, non-puttable, non-convertible, and non-exchangeable
(i.e., without additional optionality). I exclude debt backed by assets or with credit en-
hancements (such as guarantees, letter of credit, etc.). I also exclude private placements to
mitigate liquidity issues.
Dick-Nielsen (2014) provides a data-cleaning procedure for the Enhanced TRACE dataset
that I use for initial cleaning. The main purpose of this procedure is to adjust transaction
data in accordance with correction records. As part of the procedure, I exclude transactions
under special circumstances, commissioned trades, and trades with nonstandard settlements.
Some remaining transactions have inconsistent price and yield data and have to be ex-
cluded. To eliminate transactions with incorrect data, I recalculate bond prices using re-
ported yields and exclude transactions if the recalculated bond price differs from the reported
price by more than five basis points (five cents per 100 dollars notional amount).
The remaining transactions are merged with credit rating histories. In some cases, credit
ratings assigned by agencies to the same bond issue are very different. To mitigate this
inconsistency, I use the lowest credit rating of S&P and Moody’s. In particular, to sort out
transactions corresponding to high-quality debt, I select records corresponding to bonds that
are rated A or higher by both S&P and Moody’s at the transaction date.
To select long-term debt, I discard transactions when bonds have less than twelve years
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until maturity.43 Some of the long-term bonds have very long maturities (up to 100 years).
Since the maximum maturity of reported Treasury yields is limited to twenty years during
the period from February 18, 2002 to February 9, 2006, the calculation of the credit spreads
may be not reliable for very long maturities. To address this issue, I exclude transactions
with bonds maturing in more than twenty-five years.
I exclude some period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which is associated with
drastic changes in the market conditions and very severe liquidity problems.44 In such
circumstances, companies may not have time to adjust their investments. Additionally, credit
rating agencies might lag or be reluctant to adjust credit ratings at that time. For example,
AIG and Lehman Brothers had triple-A and double-A credit ratings, respectively, before
their collapses. In addition, this period is associated with massive government interventions
in the capital markets. Since the model does not account for these issues, the period from
September 2008 to May 2009 is excluded from the sample.
The remaining transactions are merged with CRSP common stock (share codes 10 and
11) daily data by matching issuers’CUSIPs. The result is merged with Compustat quarterly
data using the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) dataset. Finally, the dataset is merged
with the stock-market index, volatility, and Treasury yield time series using transaction
dates. The merging procedure excludes dates for which any time series data is not available.
43The same cutoff is used in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) for long-term bonds.
44Several empirical studies show that the effect of liquidity on credit spreads became more important at
the time of the financial distress. See, for example, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter,
and Lando (2012), Friewald, Jankovitsch, and Subrahmanyam (20012), and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath
(2013). In particular, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) find that “illiquidity becomes much more important during
the 2008 crisis, overshadowing credit risk”(p. 912).
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Since most bond issues are traded infrequently, I use monthly frequency to mitigate
market microstructure issues. To construct monthly observations, I use the last transaction
in each calendar month and exclude transactions if the bond issue had not been traded for
more than 100 days.45 To take into account that the last transaction in a month can be not
at the end of the month, I use values of explanatory variables corresponding to transaction
dates. Because Compustat data is available on a quarterly basis, the corresponding inter-
quarter quantities are obtained using linear interpolation.
The detailed description of the data cleaning and merging procedure is provided in Ap-
pendix E, and the number of observations remaining after each step is shown in Table IX.
The final dataset has 3,351 observations (differences constructed using monthly observations)
corresponding to 65 bonds issued by 29 companies. Table X in the appendix shows the list
of companies in the final dataset.
7.3 Regression Methodology
This subsection provides a description of the base-case regression model that is used to test
the relationship between volatility and credit spreads. The dependent variable in the base
case regression model is the change in credit spreads of long-term, high-quality corporate
bonds; the main explanatory variable is the change in market volatility. Additional explana-
tory variables are chosen similar to the determinants of credit spreads in Collin-Dufresne et
al. (2001).
45The last trade can be several days before the end of the month, and there can be several months between
consecutive observations.
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The panel regression equation is
∆CSi,t = α+β1∆V olt +β2∆Li,t +β3R
M
t +β4∆rt +β5∆(rt)
2 +β6∆St +β7∆Kt + εi,t. (66)
In this regression, the dependent variable is the change in the credit spread ∆CSi,t of bond
i between two consecutive observations. The explanatory variables are the change in market
volatility ∆V olt, the change in the market leverage of the issuer ∆Li,t, the market excess
return , the change in the level of interest rates ∆rt, the change in the squared interest rate
∆r2t , the change in the slope of the yield curve ∆St, and the change in the volatility smirk
∆Kt. All these changes and returns correspond to the observation dates of credit spreads
(i.e., bond transaction dates).
The credit spread is calculated as the difference between the bond yield and the corre-
sponding Treasury yield. Bond yields are provided in the TRACE database. Treasury yields
are calculated by linear interpolation using bond equivalent yields of constant maturity Trea-
suries in the Federal Reserve H.15 report corresponding to the transaction date.
In the base case model, I use the twenty-year constant maturity Treasury yield as the
interest rate level rt; the difference between twenty- and two-year rates as the slope of the
yield curve St; the excess return on the S&P 500 as the market excess return RMt ; and the
difference between -25 delta and -50 delta six-month put options on the S&P 500 as the
volatility smirk Kt. The market leverage Li,t is calculated as the book value of the debt
divided by the market value of common stocks plus the book value of the debt. The book
73
value of the debt at the time of the bond transaction is calculated using linear interpolation
of the long-term and short-term debt (corresponding to codes DLTTQ and DLCQ in the
Compustat database) from quarterly reports right before and right after the transaction
date. The market capitalization is calculated as the capitalization of stocks using the CRSP
database.
I use the following units of measure for regression variables in the base model and in
alternative specifications considered later in this section: Changes in credit spreads and
interest rates are measured in basis points; changes in squared interest rates are normalized
by 10,000; changes in volatility and the smirk are measured in percentage points; returns,
excess returns, and changes in leverage are also measured in percentage points.
To mitigate the possible correlation of error terms, I calculate the standard error clustered
by two dimensions, the bond’s CUSIP and the observation month. To check the robustness
of the results, I also calculate standard errors using different ways of clustering (including
clustering by one dimension and no clustering). To be sure that the results are not driven
by outliers I winsorize variables at 1 and 99 percent levels and also rerun regressions without
winsorizing and with variables winsorized at 5 and 95 percent levels. The results for differ-
ent model specifications including alternative standard errors are discussed in the following
subsection.
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7.4 Base-Case Regression Results
The estimation results for the base and reduced specifications are provided in Table I, which
shows that the coeffi cient corresponding to the volatility term is negative and statistically
significant in all cases. It is significant at the 0.1 percent level in the case of the base model.
The magnitude of the coeffi cient is also economically significant. The credit spread decreases
by approximately one basis point per each percentage point of volatility. The average DV01
of bonds in the sample is 12.8, and the daily standard deviation of the VIX is 1.5 percent
in the considered time span.46 Therefore, one daily standard deviation change in volatility
corresponds to 0.2 percent of the face value. This is remarkable, considering that the sample
consists of very high-quality bonds (rated A and higher).
Signs of other coeffi cients are persistent among regression specifications and consistent
with the results in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). Credit spreads increase with leverage,
the slope of the risk-free yield curve, and the volatility smirk. Credit spreads decrease
with the market excess return and the level of the risk-free interest rate. Interestingly, the
coeffi cient corresponding to the leverage of the company has the correct sign but is not
statistically significant, which is also consistent with observations in Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001). To check the robustness of the results, I re-estimate models excluding the leverage.
The coeffi cients corresponding to the volatility term remain negative and statistically and
economically significant in all cases.
46DV01 is the dollar value of one percentage point per 100 dollars notional amount. The sample average,
12.81, is a reasonable value for long-term, high-grade bonds.
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Table I
Base Case and Reduced Specifications
The first column corresponds to the base case regression with the full set of covariates, ∆CSi,t =
α + β1∆V olt + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M




+ β6∆St + β7∆Kt + εi,t, where ∆ denotes
the change in the variables, CSi,t is the credit spread of bond i, V olt is market volatility mea-
sured by the VIX, ∆Li,t is the issuer’s leverage, RMt is the market excess return measured by
S&P 500, rt is the interest rate level measured by the twenty-year Treasury yield, St is the yield
curve slope measured by the difference between twenty- and two-year Treasury yields, and Kt is
the change in the volatility smirk measured by the difference between implied volatilities of -50
delta and -25 delta six-month put options on S&P 500. The remaining columns correspond to
reduced specifications. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values of co-
effi cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance levels.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
∆V olt -1.01∗∗∗ -0.68∗ -0.69∗ -0.67∗∗ -0.92∗∗ -0.70∗∗ -0.92∗∗ -0.99∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-2.53) (-2.53) (-2.64) (-3.06) (-2.73) (-3.06) (-3.37)
∆Li,t 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.78 0.91 0.83 0.94 0.83
(1.75) (1.69) (1.74) (1.59) (1.78) (1.64) (1.82) (1.69)
RMt -1.08∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-4.92) (-4.64) (-4.67) (-4.83) (-4.03) (-4.57) (-4.58)
∆rt -0.75∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗





5.10∗∗ 2.21 5.20∗∗ 2.02
(2.68) (1.23) (2.71) (1.12)
∆St 0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(4.23) (3.27) (3.81) (3.69)
∆Kt 3.63∗∗ 2.77 2.65 3.73∗
(2.59) (1.91) (1.85) (2.49)
Intercept 0.73 0.83 0.77 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.75 0.86
(1.75) (1.71) (1.64) (1.84) (1.70) (1.73) (1.63) (1.88)
N 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351
R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
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To further corroborate the relationship, I re-estimate the model using subsamples of
data. Table II shows the results for different temporal data splits. The financial crisis is a
natural time point to split the sample. Columns I and II correspond to splitting the data
by observation time, before and after the financial crisis. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
consider the time to maturity and the bond’s age as proxies to bond liquidity, arguing that
shorter bonds may be more liquid due to “maturity clienteles for corporate bonds,” and
older bonds may be less liquid similar to on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries. Bao, Pan,
and Wang (2011) find that illiquidity indeed increases with the maturity and the age of the
bond. Columns III and IV correspond to the split by the time to maturity, 12 to 18 years
and 18 to 25 years, respectively. Columns V and VI correspond to younger and older bonds
with ages below and above 12 years, respectively. In all cases, the coeffi cient corresponding
to the volatility term is negative and statistically significant. It has the same magnitude,
approximately minus one, as in the full sample case.
Table III shows the results for the subsamples created based on company and bond char-
acteristics. The outstanding notional amount is considered a liquidity proxy by Longstaff,
Mithal, and Neis (2005) since a higher outstanding amount may correspond to a higher
availability of bonds. Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) confirm that illiquidity decreases with
the issue size. The size of the bond issue (up to 250 million and more than 250 million) is
considered in Columns I and II. Most of the issuers in the sample are manufacturing com-
panies (see Table X in Appendix E). Column III corresponds to manufacturing and Column
IV corresponds to other (mostly retail) companies. In all cases, the volatility coeffi cient is
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Table II
Sample Splits by Time, Maturity, and Age







is estimated using subsamples of the data. Columns I and II correspond to the split of the sam-
ple by the observation time, respectively, before and after the financial crisis. Columns III and
IV correspond to bonds with 12 to 18 and 18 to 25 years to maturity, respectively. Columns
V and VI correspond to subsamples of younger (less 12 years) and older (more than 12 years)
bonds, respectively. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values of co-
effi cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance levels.
I II III IV V VI
∆V olt -0.89∗ -0.99∗ -1.17∗∗∗ -0.91∗ -0.80∗ -1.32∗∗∗
(-2.32) (-2.11) (-3.80) (-2.50) (-2.15) (-3.71)
∆Li,t 1.27∗ -0.11 0.55 1.19 1.18∗ 0.51
(2.39) (-0.11) (0.70) (1.89) (2.18) (0.55)
RMt -0.65∗ -1.62∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗ -0.66∗ -1.66∗∗∗
(-2.13) (-2.84) (-4.33) (-2.71) (-2.48) (-4.19)
∆rt -0.24 -0.35 -0.60∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗ -0.55∗





-0.12 -0.06 3.03 5.97∗ 6.43∗ 2.04
(-0.02) (-0.01) (1.10) (2.40) (2.04) (0.73)
∆St 0.18∗∗∗ 0.06 0.15∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(4.57) (0.46) (2.80) (3.32) (3.53) (2.78)
∆Kt 3.75∗ 1.78 3.43 3.73 3.74 3.44
(2.27) (0.88) (1.45) (1.88) (1.85) (1.58)
Intercept 1.38∗∗ -0.66 0.87 0.65 0.80 0.63
(2.97) (-0.70) (1.93) (1.37) (1.69) (1.29)
N 2457 894 1519 1832 1844 1506
R2 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
adj. R2 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09
78
negative and less than one standard error from -1.01 (the value corresponding to the full
sample). The coeffi cient is significant in all except one subsample with a smaller number of
observations where the regression coeffi cient is even more negative than in the full sample
(-1.10). In addition, I check that the results are not driven by outliers. Columns V and
VI show results obtained without winsorizing and with variables winsorized at the 5 and 95
percent levels. In both cases, the results are similar to the base case.
As an additional robustness check, I re-estimate the model using alternative specifications
of explanatory variables. The results are provided in Table IV. In particular, I use the VXO
index to measure market volatility, the S&P 100 index to measure market returns, the ten-
year instead of twenty-year Treasury yield, and the three-year yield instead of the two-year
yield. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the base case specification.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) additionally consider the market return instead of the excess
return and the stock return instead of leverage. I also re-estimate the model using these
variables. The results are very similar again.
Finally, I use different methods to calculate the standard error.47 Table V provides
t-statistics calculated using alternative standard error specifications. The first column cor-
responds to the base case standard error double-clustered by bond issue (CUSIP) and time
(observation month). The remaining columns correspond to the following standard errors:
double-clustered by issuer (company) and time, clustered by bond issue, clustered by issuer,
clustered by time, heteroscedasticity-consistent error without clustering, and the usual OLS
47Standard errors clustered by firm and time are examined in Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011).
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Table III
Sample Splits by Issue Size and Industry
The base model, ∆CSi,t = α + β1∆V olt + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M





β7∆Kt + εi,t, is estimated using subsamples of the data. Columns I and II correspond to
the split of the sample by the size of the bond issue, up to and above 250 million, respec-
tively. Column III corresponds to manufacturing and column IV corresponds to all other
companies. Columns V and VI correspond to non-winsorized and winsorized at 5/95 percent
level variables. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values of coeffi -
cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance levels.
I II III IV V VI
∆V olt -1.01∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -1.10 -1.19∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗
(-2.83) (-2.34) (-3.19) (-1.37) (-3.31) (-3.59)
∆Li,t 1.27 0.45 0.10 4.03∗∗ 1.16∗ 0.56
(1.60) (0.65) (0.18) (2.23) (1.94) (1.29)
RMt -1.00∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗ -0.57 -0.91∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗
(-3.33) (-2.82) (-4.16) (-0.96) (-2.90) (-4.49)
∆rt -0.80∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗ -0.60∗∗∗ -1.25∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗





5.10∗∗ 4.98∗ 3.92∗ 9.11∗∗∗ 6.55∗∗∗ 3.11∗
(2.18) (1.82) (1.92) (2.62) (2.75) (1.88)
∆St 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(4.25) (1.63) (3.05) (3.46) (4.05) (4.90)
∆Kt 2.72 5.95∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗ 5.73 4.94∗∗∗ 2.84∗∗
(1.26) (2.87) (1.96) (1.40) (3.04) (2.15)
Intercept 0.56 1.06∗∗ 0.64 0.49 0.52 0.99∗∗
(1.16) (2.22) (1.49) (0.41) (1.09) (2.42)
N 2098 1253 2561 790 3351 3351
R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.08
adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.08
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Table IV
Alternative Specifications of Variables




is estimated using alternative measurements of regressors. Column I corresponds to market volatil-
ity, V olt, measured by the VXO instead of the VIX. Column II corresponds to market excess
returns, RMt , measured by S&P 100 instead of S&P 500. Column III corresponds to marked
returns instead of excess returns. Column IV corresponds to calculations using the ten-year
instead of twenty-year Treasury yields. Column V corresponds to the yield curve slope cal-
culated using three-year instead of two-year yields. Column VI corresponds to the volatility
smirk calculated using one-year instead of six-month options. Columns VII and VIII corre-
spond to, respectively, stock returns and excess returns instead of changes in the market leverage
of the company. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values of coeffi -
cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance levels.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
∆V olt -0.82∗∗ -0.87∗∗ -0.94∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(-3.07) (-3.13) (-3.27) (-3.36) (-3.51) (-3.44) (-3.50) (-3.51)
∆Li,t 0.89 1.03∗ 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.85 -0.16 -0.17
(1.76) (2.09) (1.87) (1.79) (1.76) (1.68) (-1.43) (-1.56)
RMt -1.05∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ -0.98∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -1.05∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.37) (-3.61) (-4.03) (-4.10) (-3.96) (-3.70) (-3.67)
∆rt -0.75∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗





5.14∗∗ 5.56∗∗ 5.19∗∗ 3.61∗ 5.20∗∗ 5.21∗∗ 5.17∗∗ 5.19∗∗
(2.68) (2.94) (2.73) (2.12) (2.60) (2.73) (2.69) (2.70)
∆St 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(4.24) (4.48) (4.31) (2.89) (3.70) (4.34) (4.22) (4.24)
∆Kt 2.90∗ 3.69∗∗ 3.68∗∗ 3.96∗∗ 3.69∗∗ 3.14∗ 3.61∗ 3.61∗
(2.37) (2.63) (2.62) (2.67) (2.64) (1.98) (2.56) (2.56)
Intercept 0.75 0.52 0.85∗ 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.86∗ 0.83
(1.79) (1.24) (1.98) (1.78) (1.83) (1.70) (2.00) (1.96)
N 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
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standard error. In all cases, the volatility coeffi cient is statistically significant at the 0.1
percent level. Note that the base case standard error is one of the most conservative. The
standard error double clustered by issuer and time produces a higher significance of the
volatility coeffi cient than in the base case. The t-statistic calculated using the usual OLS
standard error is the highest and much higher than the base case t-statistic (-4.17 vs. -3.48).
A stronger theoretical prediction is the U-shaped relationship between the credit quality
of corporate bonds and the regression coeffi cient on changes in stock volatility. According
to the model, the coeffi cient should be positive for very low-quality bonds. The value of the
coeffi cient should decrease and become negative for higher quality bonds. The coeffi cient
should diminish for the highest quality bonds. This is exactly what one can see in Table
VI, which shows regression results for bonds bracketed by credit ratings. The regression
coeffi cient on changes in stock volatility is positive for high-yield bonds. It is negative for
investment grade bonds. The absolute value of the coeffi cient for A-rated bonds is higher
than for bonds rated below A and for bonds rated above A.48 Thus, the regression results
reproduce the predicted relationship for bonds of various credit quality.
In summary, the obtained results unanimously show that there is a negative relationship
between changes in market volatility and credit spreads. The results are robust with respect
to the model specifications. The negative relationship is robust to sample splits and is
not driven by outliers or the choice of the standard error. In addition, the empirical results
reproduce the predicted U-shaped relationship between the credit quality of corporate bonds
48Coeffi cients are statistically significant for A-rated bonds and become less significant as they declines in




The table shows estimated values of regression coeffi cients and t-statistics for the base model,
∆CSi,t = α+ β1∆V olt + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M




+ β6∆St + β7∆Kt + εi,t. Columns
I and II correspond to double clustering by bond issue and observation month and by com-
pany (issuer) and observation month. Columns III to V correspond to single clustering by
bond issue, company, and observation month, respectively. Column VI corresponds to the
heteroscedasticity-consistent error (without clustering), and column VII corresponds to the usual
OLS standard error. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values of co-
effi cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance levels.
I II III IV V VI VII
∆V olt -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.75) (-3.93) (-4.08) (-3.42) (-3.85) (-4.17)
∆Li,t 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
(1.75) (1.23) (1.64) (1.13) (1.84) (1.71) (1.94)
RMt -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗ -1.08∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-3.90) (-5.20) (-4.80) (-3.55) (-4.36) (-4.85)
∆rt -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗





5.10∗∗ 5.10∗∗ 5.10∗∗ 5.10∗ 5.10∗ 5.10∗∗ 5.10∗∗
(2.68) (2.65) (3.04) (2.76) (2.60) (2.92) (3.15)
∆St 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(4.23) (3.55) (5.25) (3.76) (4.13) (5.06) (5.70)
∆Kt 3.63∗∗ 3.63∗∗ 3.63∗∗ 3.63∗ 3.63∗ 3.63∗ 3.63∗
(2.59) (2.66) (2.79) (2.67) (2.25) (2.38) (2.58)
Intercept 0.73 0.73∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.73 0.73 0.73
(1.75) (2.03) (2.84) (3.34) (1.22) (1.46) (1.46)
N 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351 3,351
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
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Table VI
Bonds Bracketed by Credit Ratings
The table shows estimated values of regression coeffi cients and t-statistics for the base model
with bonds bracketed by credit ratings. ∆CSi,t = α + β1∆V olt + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M





+β6∆St+β7∆Kt+εi,t. Column I corresponds to high-yield bonds rated from BB+ to B-.
Column II, III, and IV correspond to investment grade bonds with credit ratings below A, A, and
higher than A, respectively. Associated t-statistics are provided in parentheses under the values
of coeffi cients. One, two, and three stars correspond to ten, five, and one percent significance levels.
I II III IV
∆V olt 0.06 -0.69 -1.21∗∗∗ -0.67∗
(0.03) (-1.57) (-3.14) (-1.73)
∆Li,t 7.92∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 0.62 1.75∗
(3.18) (3.40) (0.94) (1.89)
RMt -4.33∗∗ -1.96∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗
(-2.50) (-4.65) (-3.72) (-2.35)
∆rt -0.54 -0.81∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗





0.08 5.73∗∗ 4.66∗∗ 4.48∗∗
(0.01) (2.18) (2.19) (2.07)
∆St 0.26 0.10∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(1.61) (2.31) (2.92) (5.02)
∆Kt 3.34 1.51 2.39 6.34∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.64) (1.21) (2.78)
Intercept 8.93∗ 1.35∗ 0.45 0.73
(1.79) (1.81) (1.05) (1.36)
N 2134 4513 2173 1178
R2 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.10
adj. R2 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.09
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and the regression coeffi cient on the changes in stock volatility.
7.5 Cross-Section of Stock Volatility
This subsection shows that the negative relationship between volatility and credit spreads of
long-term, high-quality bonds established in previous sections holds if one takes into account
the cross-sectional heterogeneity of stock volatility.
To consider the heterogeneity of stock volatility, I merge the dataset with stock volatility
data in OptionMetrics Ivy DB and estimate several alternative regression specifications.
The results are provided in Table VII. Column I in this table corresponds to the base-case
regression specification.
∆CSi,t = α + β1∆V IXt + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M
t + β4∆rt + β5∆r
2
t + β6∆St + ∆Kt + εi,t. (67)
This column confirms that the base regression is not affected significantly by the merging
procedure. As one can see, the regression coeffi cients are very similar to the coeffi cients in
the first column of Table I. In particular, the coeffi cients on changes in the VIX, in the first
rows, are very similar (-1.03 vs. -1.01), and the t-statistics are also very similar (-3.54 vs.
-3.48).
Column II corresponds to the regression of changes in credit spreads on changes in the
implied volatility of thirty-day stock options instead of changes in the VIX.49 The rest of
49In all regressions in this subsection, I use the implied volatility of at-the-money call options. The results




The table shows estimated values for several specifications of stock volatility in the regression
∆CSi,t = α+ β1∆Vi,t + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M
t + β4∆rt + β5∆r
2
t + β6∆St + ∆Kt + εi,t.The first column
corresponds to the base-case model with changes in the VIX, ∆Vi,t = ∆V IXt. The second column
corresponds to the implied volatility of stocks, ∆Vi,t = ∆σi,t. Columns III and IV correspond to
the second stage regression with ∆Vi,t = β
(1)
i ∆V IXt, where β
(1)
i is the slope of the time-series




i ∆V IXt + ε
(1)
i,t . Columns
III and IV correspond to the implied and the future realized volatility of stocks respectively.
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Columns VI and VII correspond to the implied and the future realized variance of stocks
respectively. The last column corresponds to changes in logs, ∆Vi,t = ∆ log V IXt. Plus
and one, two, and three stars correspond to ten, five, one, and 0.1 percent significance level.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
∆Vi,t -1.03*** -0.09 -1.06* -1.12+ -2.12*** -1.49* -1.26+ -15.67**
(-3.54) (-0.59) (-2.56) (-1.82) (-3.48) (-2.25) (-1.71) (-2.84)
∆Li,t 0.84 0.91+ 0.94+ 0.93+ 0.83+ 0.98+ 0.90+ 0.83
(1.64) (1.84) (1.86) (1.84) (1.66) (1.96) (1.78) (1.62)
RMt -1.11*** -0.58* -0.96*** -0.64** -1.10*** -0.87*** -0.60** -0.94**
(-4.10) (-2.39) (-3.53) (-2.75) (-4.40) (-3.52) (-2.64) (-3.29)
∆rt -0.74*** -0.72*** -0.74*** -0.71*** -0.74*** -0.73*** -0.70*** -0.72***





4.96** 4.77** 4.95** 4.71** 4.98** 4.90** 4.60** 4.78**
(2.79) (2.73) (2.79) (2.70) (2.87) (2.82) (2.65) (2.66)
∆St 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15***
(4.32) (3.96) (4.31) (4.10) (4.20) (4.21) (4.06) (4.28)
∆Kt 3.69** 0.78 2.94* 1.19 3.61** 2.45* 0.98 2.80*
(2.63) (0.63) (2.18) (1.03) (2.68) (2.06) (0.83) (1.97)
Intercept 0.72+ 0.51 0.68 0.53 0.68+ 0.60 0.51 0.70
(1.72) (1.23) (1.63) (1.31) (1.71) (1.51) (1.24) (1.62)
N 3347 3347 3347 3347 3347 3347 3347 3347
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
adj. R2 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
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the explanatory variables are the same as in the base-case regression. As one can see, the
regression coeffi cient on the change in stock volatility is negative (-0.09) but smaller, and
statistically insignificant.50 ,51 This is not very surprising, as implied volatility data is noisy
because of asynchronous trading and is very sensitive to calculation assumptions for short-
term options. In the sample, the difference between the implied volatilities of at-the-money
call and put options is more than half percentage point in most cases and can be as high
as nine percentage points. Moreover, the implied volatilities of stock options are affected by
earning announcement and one-time firm-specific events unrelated to the long-term volatility
of particular assets.
To mitigate these issues, I run two-stage regressions. In the first stage, I run the univariate
time-series regression of changes in stock volatilities on changes in the VIX for each stock in





i ∆V IXt + ε
(1)
i,t . (68)
In the second-stage panel regression, I use the base-case specification with changes in the
VIX replaced by changes in the VIX multiplied by the slope coeffi cient from the first stage,
∆CSi,t = α+β1β
(1)




t +β6∆St + ∆Kt + εi,t. (69)
50Note that in addition, the coeffi cient on the volatility smile became insignificant. I rerun the regression
omitting the volatility smile variable. All coeffi cients and significance levels remained essentially the same
in this case.
51Running this regression using changes in log implied volatility produces a negative regression coeffi cient
(-3.82) with a slightly higher t-statistic (-1.01). All other regression coeffi cients are approximately the same.
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Column III shows second-stage regression coeffi cients corresponding to the regression of
changes in the implied volatility of thirty-day call options on the VIX in the first stage. In
the sample, the mean (median) value of the slope coeffi cient in the first-stage regression is
0.74 (0.77), the standard deviation is 0.20, and the skewness is -0.07. All slope coeffi cients
are positive, and most of them are statistically significant. The mean (median) value of the
t-statistics is 8.81 (8.90), and the standard deviation is 3.61. The results of the second-stage
regression are shown in column III. All coeffi cients are similar to those in the first column.
In particular, the coeffi cient on changes in the VIX multiplied by β(1)i is negative (-1.06).
52
Although the statistical significance of the coeffi cient declines, it remains significant with the
t-statistic of -2.56.
The implied volatility of stock options corresponds to the risk-neutral volatility.53 In
the model considered in the previous sections, the volatility under the risk-neutral and the
physical measure are the same; in the real world, they may be different.54 To consider
the physical volatility, I use the realized stock volatility in the first stage (the regression of
changes in realized stock volatility on changes in the VIX corresponding to the same time
52Note that the similarity of the regression coeffi cient on VIX terms in this and the base case regression
(-1.06 vs. -1.03) cannot be taken at face value. The first stage slope coeffi cients are less than one in most
cases: the mean (median) value is 0.74 (0.77). Ceteris paribus, the multiplication of the explanatory variable
by something less than one should increase the corresponding regression coeffi cient. If changes in the VIX are
multiplied by the mean slope instead of slopes of individual stocks, the regression coeffi cient is -1.03/0.74=-
1.39. Besides, the first stage estimation errors can introduce estimation bias. The effect of the bias is not
obvious in this case, although the attenuation bias usually reduces the regression coeffi cient and makes it
less significant. This logic also applies to other two-stage regressions in this section.
53Strictly speaking, the VIX is the square root of the risk-neutral expectation of the variance of the S&P
500 index. See Demeterfi et al. (1999) for details.
54See Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) for the equity variance premium.
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intervals). The mean (median) value of the slope coeffi cient is 0.19 (0.22), the standard
deviation is 0.29, and the skewness is 0.17. The high proportion of negative coeffi cients can
be explained by a lower predictive power of the VIX for individual stock volatility. Most
of the estimated coeffi cients are not significant. The mean (median) value of t-statistics is
0.63 (0.70), and the standard deviation is 1.15. The results of the second-stage regression
are shown in column IV. Although the first-stage results are noisy, the coeffi cient on changes
in the VIX multiplied by the slope coeffi cient remains negative (-1.12) and is marginally
significant with the t-statistic of -1.82. The decline in significance can be explained by the
noise introduced by the first-stage regression.
An alternative specification of the base-case regression can use the annualized variance
instead of the volatility of the stock market,55
∆CSi,t = α + β1∆V IX
2
t + β2∆Li,t + β3R
M
t + β4∆rt + β5∆r
2
t + β6∆St + ∆Kt + εi,t. (70)
This regression is shown in column V. As could be expected, the coeffi cient on the changes
in variance is negative (-2.12) and highly significant with the t-statistic of -3.48. The rest of
the coeffi cients are very similar to the base-case regression results shown in column I.
Columns VI and VII correspond to two-stage regressions. First, I run regressions of
55Note that the units of measure for the variance are different from the volatility of stocks. I scale variance
by 100 to keep the same order of the magnitude of coeffi cients.
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In the second stage, I multiply changes in the squared VIX by the slope coeffi cient obtained









t +β6∆St + ∆Kt + εi,t. (72)
Column VI shows the results of the second-stage regression corresponding to the first-stage
regressions based on the implied volatility of stocks (the regression of changes in the squared
implied volatility of thirty-day call options on changes in the squared VIX). The mean (me-
dian) value of the slope coeffi cients in the first-stage regressions is 0.95 (0.97), the standard
deviation is 0.43, and the skewness is 0.77. All slope coeffi cients are positive and statistically
significant. The mean (median) value of the t-statistics is 9.41 (8.77), and the standard de-
viation is 4.19. In the second-stage regression, the coeffi cient on the changes in the squared
VIX multiplied by the slope coeffi cient β(1)i is negative, -1.49, and statistically significant
with the t-statistic of -2.25. All other coeffi cients have the same sign and similar magnitude
as in the base-case regression.
Column VII corresponds to the first-stage regression of the future realized variance of
individual stocks on changes in the squared VIX. In the first-stage regression, the mean
(median) value of the slope coeffi cient is 0.27 (0.14), and the standard deviation is 0.50.
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Similar to the case with realized volatility, some slope coeffi cients are negative, and most
of them are insignificant. The mean (median) of the standard errors is 0.58 (0.45), and
the standard deviation is 1.41. Nevertheless, in the second-stage regression, the coeffi cient
on changes in the squared VIX multiplied by the slope coeffi cient is negative (-1.26) and
marginally significant with the t-statistic of -1.71. All other coeffi cients have the same sign
as in the base-case regression, although the coeffi cient on the volatility smile is smaller
and insignificant. Omitting the volatility smile variable does not significantly change other
coeffi cients in this case.
The last column shows the estimation of the regression with changes in the log VIX
instead of changes in the VIX. The rationale is that if individual stock volatility is propor-
tional to the VIX, then the coeffi cient of proportionality is eliminated by the differences in
log volatility, and changes in log stock volatility are the same as changes in the log VIX. The
corresponding estimation results are shown in column VIII. As one can see, the coeffi cient
on the changes in the log VIX is negative (-15.67) and significant (the t-statistic is -2.83).
The rest of the coeffi cient is similar to the base-case regression.
I also run the second-stage regressions that include the residual volatility term (the
difference between changes in implied volatilities (variances) and changes in the VIX (squared
VIX) multiplied by the corresponding slope coeffi cient). In all regressions, the regression
coeffi cient on the residual term is at least five times smaller than the coeffi cient corresponding
to changes in the VIX (squared VIX), it is always insignificant, and all other coeffi cients stay
almost the same.
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In summary, the relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit spreads of
long-term, high-quality bonds remains negative in all considered cases that take into account
the cross-sectional heterogeneity of stock volatility.
7.6 Financial Crisis
This subsection investigates the relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit
spreads of long-term, high-quality bonds during the financial crisis. It shows that, during
distressed market conditions, this relationship is positive. It also shows that including data
from a distressed period can produce an erroneous positive relationship between changes in
volatility and credit spreads for the whole sample.
Previous sections consider samples that exclude the period of financial distress after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In those cases, the relationship between changes in stock mar-
ket volatility and credit spreads of long-term, high-quality bonds is negative, as predicted
by the theoretical model in the present paper. One of the model’s assumptions is that
companies can adjust their allocation of resources and that debt is priced according to the
expectations for such adjustments. This may not be a good assumption in periods of finan-
cial distress, when fluctuations are drastic, and companies may not be able to adjust their
investments. Furthermore, several empirical studies have shown that the effect of liquidity
on credit spreads became more important during financial distress. See, for example, Bao,
Pan, and Wang (2011), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2012), Friewald, Jankovitsch,
and Subrahmanyam (2012), and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013). In particular, Bao,
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Pan, and Wang (2011) find that “illiquidity becomes much more important during the 2008
crisis, overshadowing credit risk” (p. 912). In this case, the VIX can be related to credit
spreads in a way not described by the model.
Table VIII shows the regression results for samples that include the financial crisis. Col-
umn I corresponds to the subsample period from September 2008 until May 2009 (distressed
market). The results correspond to long-term, high-quality (rated A or higher) bonds. As
one can see, the results are very different from the regression estimation in column I of Table
I, which corresponds to the subsample that excludes the period of market distress (normal
market). For the distressed market subsample, the relationship between changes in stock
market volatility and credit spreads is positive and statistically significant (2.03 with the
t-statistic of 2.19). Note that the regression coeffi cient is significant even though the sample
size is relatively small (341 observations). The Wald test shows that regressions coeffi cients
for these two subsamples are significantly different.56
Column II in Table VIII shows the results for the regression model augmented by the
distressed market indicator and the interaction terms with this indicator, using the whole
sample, including the distressed market period. As expected, the coeffi cient on changes in
the VIX is the same as in the normal market subsample (-1.01 with the t-statistic of -3.48),
and the coeffi cient on the interaction term with changes in the VIX is positive and highly
56To check that this result is not driven by the way of calculations of the covariance matrix, I recalculate the
test using different way of clustering and without clustering. In all cases the result is statistically significant











+β6∆St+∆Kt+εi,t, and columns II, VI, and VII correspond to the base-
case regression augmented by the indicator of the distressed market (from September 2008 till May
2009), IDM , and interaction terms corresponding to this indicator. The table shows the interaction
term with the changes in volatility. Other interaction terms are omitted from the table. Column
I corresponds to the distressed market period. Column II and III correspond to the full sample
including the distressed market period. Column IV and VI correspond to the subsample from the
beginning of the sample data (July 2002) till May 2009. Columns V and VII correspond to the sub-
sample from September 2008 till the end of sample data (December 2012). One, two, and three stars
correspond to five, one, and 0.1 percent significance level. t-statistics are provided in parentheses.
I II III IV V VI VII
∆V olt 2.03* -1.01*** 0.65 1.25*** 1.22* -0.89* -0.99*
(2.19) (-3.48) (1.54) (3.32) (2.34) (-2.32) (-2.12)
∆Li,t -3.32 0.88 -0.05 0.13 -1.76 1.27* -0.11
(-1.25) (1.75) (-0.06) (0.15) (-1.12) (2.39) (-0.11)
RMt -0.14 -1.08*** -0.26 0.17 -0.24 -0.65* -1.62**
(-0.13) (-3.96) (-0.53) (0.37) (-0.34) (-2.13) (-2.84)
∆rt -1.12* -0.75*** -1.18*** -1.73*** -1.22** -0.24 -0.35





3.08 5.10** 9.37** 15.14*** 6.13 -0.12 -0.06
(0.35) (2.68) (2.75) (3.36) (1.13) (-0.02) (-0.01)
∆St 0.48 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.16** 0.52*** 0.18*** 0.06
(1.68) (4.23) (3.83) (3.10) (4.61) (4.57) (0.46)
∆Kt 2.29 3.63** 3.36 4.20 0.25 3.75* 1.78
(0.39) (2.59) (1.33) (1.73) (0.08) (2.27) (0.88)
IDM ×∆V olt 3.04** 2.93** 3.02**
(3.27) (2.94) (3.12)
Intercept -6.48 0.73 -0.01 0.82 -4.30* 1.38** -0.66
(-0.87) (1.75) (-0.02) (0.94) (-2.47) (2.97) (-0.70)
N 341 3692 3692 2798 1235 2798 1235
R2 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.22
adj. R2 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.21
94
significant (3.04 with the t-statistic of 3.27).57 ,58 ,59 Thus, the relationship between changes
in volatility and credit spreads of long-term, high-quality bonds are different in the normal
and distressed market samples.
The difference in the sign of the regression coeffi cient for the distressed and normal market
subsamples provides a possible explanation for why some empirical studies find a positive re-
lationship between changes in volatility and credit spreads for long-term, high-quality bonds.
Column III shows the regression results for the whole sample, from July 2002 until December
2012, including the distressed market period. As one can see, the coeffi cient is positive al-
though insignificant (0.65 with the t-statistic of 1.54). This result is misleading. The positive
coeffi cient is induced by observations corresponding to the distressed market conditions after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and cannot be interpreted as a general positive relationship
between volatility and credit spreads. As shown in column II, the coeffi cient on changes in
volatility is negative and significant if the regression includes interaction terms.
Columns IV and V show two more misleading regressions. Column IV corresponds to the
subsample from the beginning of the sample data (July 2002) until May 2009, and column V
corresponds to the subsample from September 2008 until the end of the sample data (Decem-
57Note that coeffi cients in column II are the same as coeffi cients in column I of Table I. Strictly speaking,
this result depends on the winsorizing procedure: I winsorize subsamples before merging to have consistent
results. The estimation using winsorizing after merging produces similar results in this case and other cases
in this section.
58The value of the interaction coeffi cient can be calculated as the difference between the regression coef-
ficients on the changes in volatility corresponding to the distressed market subsample and the subsample
without the distressed market period.
59Coeffi cients on other interaction terms and on the indicator variable are insignificant and are omitted
from the table. These coeffi cients are also omitted for subsequent regressions with interaction terms.
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ber 2012). Both subsamples include the distressed market period from September 2008 until
May 2009. As the result, the regression coeffi cients on changes in volatility are positive (1.25
and 1.22) and statistically significant (t-statistics are 3.32 and 2.34, respectively). However,
the positive sign of the regression coeffi cients is misleading; the sign is negative if these re-
gressions are corrected by adding interaction terms. The corresponding results are shown
in columns VI and VII. In the regression with interaction terms, the coeffi cients on changes
in volatility are, as expected, the same as in columns I and II of Table II corresponding
respectively to subsamples before and after the crisis. These coeffi cients are negative (-0.89
and -0.99) and significant (t-statistics are -2.32 and -2.12, respectively). The coeffi cients on
the interaction term corresponding to changes in volatility are positive and highly significant
(2.93 and 3.02 with t-statistics of 2.94 and 3.12, respectively).
In summary, the relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit spreads of
long-term, high-quality bonds is negative in normal market conditions but positive in the
distressed market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Provided examples show that
regression results can be misleading if the sample includes data from the distressed market
period.
8 Conclusion
This paper explains the puzzling negative relationship between changes in market volatility
and credit spreads of corporate bonds, an empirical reality heretofore unexplained in the
theoretical literature. To solve this puzzle, the present study extends Leland’s (1994) capital
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structure model to employ Merton’s (1969) approach to asset allocation, and explores the
interrelationship between corporate investment decisions (the left-hand side of the balance
sheet) and debt financing (the right-hand side of the balance sheet). The extended model
incorporates borrowing, investment, payout, and bankruptcy decisions of risk-averse agents.
It shows how such phenomena as flight to quality, gambling for resurrection, and bankruptcy
for profit emerge sequentially as agents’wealth deteriorates toward bankruptcy.
Investment and payout decisions, in turn, affect debt prices. The paper shows that,
contrary to common beliefs, credit spreads can be lower when the volatility of risky assets is
higher. This happens when the value of the company’s assets is high relative to the amount
of debt. In this case, the payout rate is lower, and the company makes less risky investments
when risky assets are more volatile. This conservative behavior decreases the probability
of bankruptcy and leads to lower credit spreads. In addition, higher asset volatility leads
to higher stock volatility if the company cannot instantaneously adjust its investments to
changes in asset volatility. The combination of these two effects produces the negative
relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit spreads. This happens because
the stocks and long-term bonds of high-quality borrowers react differently to changes in
asset volatility. Stock volatility is sensitive to the short-term volatility of the firm’s assets
corresponding to fixed asset composition, while credit spreads depend on the bond’s lifetime
volatility of the firm’s assets that can be adjusted in the long run.
In addition, the model presented in this paper predicts a U-shaped relationship between
the credit quality of corporate bonds and the regression coeffi cient (in the regression of
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changes in credit spreads on changes in stock volatility controlling for other variables). Intu-
itively, the coeffi cient is positive when the company is close to bankruptcy because the option
to default is more valuable in this case (as in Merton, 1974). It is negative for high-quality
debt as explained in the present paper. The value of the coeffi cient approaches zero as the
credit quality increases further, and the debt becomes essentially risk free.
The model considered in the present paper admits an analytical solution and provides
an intuitive explanation of the relationship between changes in stock volatility and credit
spreads. This relationship is robust to model specifications. In particular, assumptions of
continuous reallocation of resources between risk-free and risky assets and constant volatility
of risky assets can be relaxed, though at the expense of analytical tractability. A compli-
mentary study considers an alternative model in which the allocation of resources is fixed for
some period of time and volatility of risky investments follows a two-state Markov process.
The empirical part of the paper tests the negative relationship between changes in credit
spreads and equity volatility using a comprehensive set of bond transaction data. The re-
gression analysis corroborates the negative relationship between changes in market volatility
measured by the VIX and credit spreads of long-term, high-quality corporate bonds. This
relationship is statistically and economically significant, and it is robust to sample splits and
to outliers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions for long-term bonds, the empirical
results show that the regression coeffi cient is a U-shaped function of bonds’credit quality:
the coeffi cient is more negative for A-rated bonds than for bonds rated below and above A.
In summary, endogenous asset composition can explain the negative relationship between
98
changes in stock volatility and credit spreads and provides insight into the relationship
between the stock and bond markets. Further empirical examination of the theoretical
predictions induced by endogenous asset composition is the subject of ongoing research.
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A.1 Suffi cient Wealth
This section shows that bankruptcy cannot be avoided with certainty if the value of assets
is below some threshold.
Proposition
If V0 < c/r, then bankruptcy cannot be avoided with certainty.
Proof
Suppose to the contrary that there are payout and allocation policies, C∗t and π
∗
t , such
that bankruptcy is avoided with certainty. In this case Vt > 0 with probability one for any
t. Under the risk-neutral measure, the dynamics of the value of assets for these payout and
allocation policies is given by
dV t = (rV t − C∗t − c) dt+ σπ∗tV tdZ
Q
t . (73)
Therefore, the discounted value, Xt = e−rtV t, follows




The expected value of Xt under the risk-neutral measure can be written as




( −C∗s − c) e−rsds
 ≤ V 0 − t∫
0












. Therefore, the risk-neutral probability
PQ [V t∗ < 0] = P
Q [Xt∗ < 0] > 0. (76)
By the equivalence of the physical and risk-neutral measures on Ft∗,
P [V t∗ < 0] > 0. (77)
Contradiction. Q.E.D.
Due to the time homogeneity of the problem, the proposition can be restated as the
following obvious corollary.
Corollary
If Vt < c/r for any t, then bankruptcy cannot be avoided with certainty.
A.2 Solvency Constraints
This section provides necessary and suffi cient conditions on the coupon rate and the amount
of debt, which guaranty that bankruptcy never happens.
If K/α > c/r, then for any value of assets V ≥ K/α before bankruptcy, the amount
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retained after bankruptcy, αV −K, is lower than the value of assets reduced by the cost of
carrying debt forever, c/r, because
αV −K = α (V −K/α) < α (V − c/r) ≤ V − c/r.
Since UB is an increasing function of the value of assets,60
UB (αV −K) < UB (V − c/r) = UNB (V ; c) .
Hence, when K/α > c/r, it is never optimal to declare bankruptcy because a higher ex-
pected utility can be obtained if the agent continues to pay the coupon rate forever. Thus,
bankruptcy will never occur if K/α > c/r and V0 > c/r. Note that if K/α > c/r, then the
risk-free debt is a possible equilibrium outcome because in the case of risk-free debt
V0 = V
E + PD (V0, c̄) > P
D (V0,c) = c/r ≥ c/r.
Therefore, assuming that the borrower can always obtain the highest possible price of
debt in the competitive lending market, there is no bankruptcy if K/α > c/r, that is, if
c̄ < Kr/ ((1− τ)α). Similar steps show that in the case of K/α = c/r, the agent cannot
achieve higher expected utility by declaring bankruptcy.
60αV −K ≤ 0 for c/r < V ≤ K/α. I extend UB (V ) = −∞ for V ≤ 0 to have UB (αV −K) defined for
V > c/r.
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In the other case, when K/α < c/r,
αV −K = α (V − c/r) + α (c/r −K/α) > V − c/r
for V suffi ciently close to c/r. For such values of V ,
UB (αV −K) > UB (V − c/r) = UNB (V ; c̄) .
Therefore, in this case, it is more attractive to declare bankruptcy than to continue paying
the coupon rate forever. Thus, the bankruptcy state is attainable if K/α < c/r, that is,
if c̄ > Kr/ ((1− τ)α). The following solvency constraint on debt payments combines the
considered cases.
Solvency Constraint on Debt Payments






To obtain the solvency constraint on the amount of debt, note that the interest rate paid
on debt cannot be lower than the risk-free rate. Therefore, either D = c̄/r or D < c̄/r. If
D ≤ K/ ((1− τ)α), then D = c̄/r is a possible outcome because the solvency constraint is
satisfied in this case, andD < c̄/r cannot be an equilibrium outcome because the agent would
prefer to deviate by choosing the risk-free debt contract with the same amount of borrowing
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at a lower coupon rate. Therefore, if D ≤ K/ ((1− τ)α), then there is no bankruptcy. If
D > K/ ((1− τ)α), then c/r > K/α because c̄/r ≥ D. Therefore, bankruptcy cannot
be avoided with certainty in this case. This gives the following solvency constraint on the
amount of debt.
Solvency Constraint on the Amount of Debt
There is no bankruptcy if and only if the amount of debt satisfies
D ≤ K
(1− τ)α.
B Investment and Payout Policies without Bankruptcy
This appendix derives optimal investment and payout policies that avoid bankruptcy with
certainty in the model with coupon payments (adjusted for the tax shield) at a constant rate
c. Results corresponding to the model without debt can be obtained by taking c = 0. In
addition to the case with endogenous investment and payout choices, exogenous investment
and/or payout policies are also considered in this appendix.
The optimal investment and payout policies that avoid bankruptcy are feasible if the
initial wealth is higher than the cost of debt, V0 > c/r, as shown in Appendix A. Moreover,
the value of assets has to be higher than the cost of debt to avoid bankruptcy with certainty.
In the following subsections, I use this fact and consider the value of assets reduced by the
cost of debt, Vt − c/r.
Note that, as shown in section 3.2, if the solvency constraint is satisfied, c/r ≤ K/α,
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then optimal investment and payout policies that avoid bankruptcy are the optimal policies.
B.1 Endogenous Investment and Payout Policies
In the notation of the main model, the dynamics of the total value of assets are given by
dVt = ((r + λπt)Vt − Ct − c) dt+ σπtVtdZt, (78)
where λ = µ− r. This equation can be written in terms of the value of assets above the cost
of debt Ṽt = Vt − c/r as
dṼt =
(
(r + λπ̃t) Ṽt − Ct
)
dt+ σπ̃tṼtdZt, (79)












































where I (·) is the inverse function of u′ (·). The substitution of these first-order conditions































1− γ . (84)













1− γ . (85)















Thus, the value function and optimal investment and payout policies are given, respectively,
by
U (V ) =
b(V − c/r)1−γ





(V − c/r) , (88)
and
C = θ (V − c/r) , (89)
where the payout ratio is














Suppose that the allocation policy is an exogenously given constant proportion of wealth
adjusted by the cost of debt, π̃ (V − c/r). In this case, the dynamics of the value of assets
have the same form (79) as in the previous subsection (keeping in mind that π̃ is a given















Accordingly, there is just one first order condition given by (82). The substitution of this






















The same conjecture (84) leads to the value function of the same functional form,
U (V ) =
b(V − c/r)1−γ







δ − (1− γ)
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In this case, the optimal payout policy is
C = θ (V − c/r) , (95)
where




δ − (1− γ)
(





Note that, in the case of optimal allocation policy given by (88), equation (94) corresponds
to (86). In this case, the value function (93) and the optimal payout policy (95) coincide
with the ones in the previous subsection.
B.3 Exogenous Payout Policy
In the case when the payout rate is an exogenous constant fraction of the debt-adjusted
wealth, θ (W − c/r), the same approach as in previous subsections leads to the HJB equation
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The substitution of the first order condition and the same conjecture (84) give the following
value function,
U (V ) =
b(V − c/r)1−γ


















It does not depend on the payout choice and is the same as in the case with endogenous
payout and allocation policies.
Note that in the case of the optimal payout policy given by (90), the term in square
brackets in formula (99) is zero, and therefore, (99) corresponds to (86). In this case, the
value function (98) is the same as in the case with endogenous payout and allocation policies.
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B.4 Exogenous Payout and Allocation Policies
In the case when the payout rate and allocation are exogenous constant proportions of the













The solution for this ODE obtained using the same conjecture is
U (V ) =
b(V − c/r)1−γ






−γθδ − (1− γ)
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Note that in the case of the optimal payout ratio given by (96), this equation corresponds
to (94), and in the case of the optimal allocation rule given by (100), it coincides with (99)
as expected.
C Possible Bankruptcy
This appendix provides solution details in the case when the bankruptcy threshold is attain-
able.
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C.1 Payout and Allocation Policies
Before bankruptcy, the dynamics of the total value of assets is given by
dVt = ((r + λπt)Vt − Ct − c) dt+ σπtVtdZt, (104)









In this notation the dynamics are
dVt =
(
(r + λπt)Vt − C̃t
)
dt+ σπtVtdZt, (105)
and the optimization problem is given by













The corresponding HJB equation can be written as

















The first order conditions on π and C̃ are, respectively,







C̃ = Ĩ (UV ) . (109)
where Ĩ (x) = x−1/γ + c is the inverse function of ũ′ (·). The substitution of these first-order


















The value function has to satisfy the following smooth pasting and value matching conditions




















where UB (V ) is the indirect utility function after bankruptcy.
A similar ODE with a zero-wealth boundary condition is considered in Presman and
Sethi (1991). In this section, I extend the solution of ODE (110) provided in that paper to
the non-zero bankruptcy boundary determined by (111) and (112).
Assuming that the solution is strictly concave (as it is the case), the marginal utility
of wealth is a strictly decreasing function of wealth, and accordingly, v = − ln (UV (V )) is
a strictly increasing function of wealth. Therefore, we can consider the inverse function
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V = V (v). Using this change of variables, derivatives of the value function can be written
as
UV (V (v)) = e
−v (113)
and
UV V (V (v)) = −e−v/V ′ (v) . (114)
Using these expressions, ODE (110) can be written as
δU (V (v)) = ũ (i (v)) + (rV (v)− i (v)) e−v + ψe−vV ′ (v) , (115)
where ψ = λ2/ (2σ2) and i (v) = Ĩ (e−v). The differentiation of this equation produces a
second-order linear ODE:
ψV ′′ (v) = (δ + ψ − r)V ′ (v) + rV (v)− i (v) . (116)
This ODE admits a parameterized solution (see the following subsection for verification)
that extends the solution proposed in Presman and Sethi (1991) to the case of non-zero





































+ A (w)− V B
)
, (119)
where y+ and y−are roots of the characteristic equation,
χ (y) ≡ ψy2 + (r − δ − ψ) y − r = 0, (120)
y± =
ψ + δ − r ±
√
(r − δ − ψ)2 + 4ψr
2ψ
, (121)
and φ ≡ ψ (y+ − y−) =
√
(r − δ − ψ)2 + 4ψr > 0. In this case, there are two parameters,
w and V B, corresponding to two boundary conditions (111) and (112).61 Note that χ (0) =
−r < 0 and χ (1) = −δ < 0. Therefore, y+ > 1 and the improper integral in (118) converges
(assuming γ > 1).






























61The solution considered in Presman and Sethi (1991) corresponds to V B = 0.
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where ρ± = 1− y±.




= V B. The smooth pasting
condition (112) gives the value of w in terms of the bankruptcy boundary,

















In the case of CRRA utility function, UBV (V ) = bV
−γ. Therefore,




− ln (αb) , (124)



































where wB is given by (123). The solution to this equation is provided later in this appendix.




is an increasing function of v. Consider the inverse function v = Y
(




function can be calculated as









where V B is the solution to (126), wB is given by (123), and J(v;w, V B) is given by (122).
From the first order condition (108) and equations (113), and (114) the optimal investment
policy can be written as,

























V ;wB, V B
)
, wB, V B
)]
. (128)
The optimal payout rate is given by






V ;wB, V B
)))
. (129)
In the case of CRRA utility function, I (x) = x−1/γ. Therefore, the non-negative payout
condition is satisfied,
C = e−Y (V ;w
B ,V B)/γ ≥ 0. (130)
The verification of the optimality of the solution is a standard application of the Ito’s
123
formula that can be done similar to Karatzas et al. (1986).
C.2 Parameterized Solution
To verify the solution of equation (116) given by (117), (118), and (119), note that y+y− =
− r
ψ


























































































+ i (v) =
= A (v)
(










C.3 Optimal Bankruptcy Boundary




− V B + A (w) . (131)
















rV B + φA (w)
]
. (132)
In the case of CRRA utility function,









(x− c)−γy+dx = 1






































































































































Note that y+y− = −r/ψ. Therefore, rρ+/y+ = − (r + ψy−), and after some simplifications
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) > 0. (141)
It is easy to see that V B is a decreasing function of ψ, and therefore, an increasing
function of σ.
Not that when the solvency constraint is violated, c/r > K/α, the bankruptcy boundary
is higher than K/α, that is αV B−K > 0 as expected. Otherwise, bankruptcy is not feasible.
C.4 Dynamics of Marginal Utility
This section provides the dynamics of the marginal utility of wealth under the risk-neutral
and physical measures.63 These dynamics are used to calculate the risk-neutral probability
of default and the debt and equity prices.
62A similar formula is obtained by Jeanblanc et al. (2004) using another approach based on Karatzas et
al. (1986).
63The derivation of the risk-neutral dynamics of marginal utilities follows Presman and Sethi (1996) who
considered these dynamics and the probability of bankruptcy under the physical measure in the case of
zero-wealth bankruptcy. The primal interest of this appendix is the risk-neutral dynamics and probabilities
since they are relevant for debt prices.
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Under the risk-neutral measure Q , the dynamics of the total value of assets are given
by,
dVt = (rVt − Ct − c) dt+ σπtVtdZQt , (142)
where ZQt is the standard Brownian motion under Q. These dynamics can be written in
terms of variables in equation (105) as
dV t =
(

























Note that by the definition of Y ,
Y ′ (V ) = 1/V ′ (145)
and
Y ′′ (V ) = −V ′′/(V ′)3 . (146)
Also note that, from the first order condition (108) and equations (113) and (114), the





64To simplify the notation I omit parameters hereafter in this subsection.
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From (116), the optimal payout rate satisfies
C̃ = −ψV ′′ + (δ + ψ − r)V ′ + rV. (149)
The substitution of this expression into the dynamics equation (148) eliminates dependencies
on V, V ′, and V ′′:




Thus, under the risk-neutral measure Q, vt is the Brownian motion with drift µQv = r−δ−ψ
and volatility σv =
λ
σ
. Therefore, the marginal utility of wealthy UV (and therefore, the
marginal utility of payout/consumption) is a geometric Brownian motion.
The dynamics under the physical measure P can be obtained using the adjustment of the
Brownian motion process by the market price of risk, dZQt =
λ
σ
dt + dZt. Therefore, under






C.5 Probability of Bankruptcy
By the concavity of the value function, vt = − ln (UV (Vt)) is an increasing function of






its value at bankruptcy. The time of bankruptcy
corresponds to the first passage time
TB = inf
{




t : vt ≤ vB
}
, (151)













whereM is either the physical measure, P , or the risk-neural measure, Q, volatility σv = λ/σ,
and the drift µPv = r + ψ − δ under the physical measure and µQv = r − ψ − δ under the
risk-neutral measure. Therefore, the probability to default up to time t is given by the









































where v0 is the initial value and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The
differentiation of this expression with respect to t gives the density of default that can be






































, ifµMv > 0.
(155)
whereM can be P or Q. This probability can be written in terms of marginal utilities. When















. As expected, the probability of
default is higher under the risk-neutral measure.66
Note that if µMv < 0, then the density function (154) is the PDF of the Inverse Gaussian
distribution,67





















/µMv . The expected time to
default in this case is
66Note that if µQ ≤ 0 < µP , then PQ[TB < ∞] = 1 and PP [TB < ∞] < 1, even though P and Q are
equivalent measures. This is not a controversy because these measures are equivalent on Ft for any finite




∈ F∞ does not belong to any finite-time filtration.















If µMv > 0, then a positive probability mass, 1−e−2(v0−v












, gives the expected value of a unit payment at bankruptcy when x = −r. This
MGF for x < 0 can be derived as follows.
























































The second term does not depend on t, and the first term corresponds to the kernel of the




















Note that this is the MGF of the Inverse Gaussian distribution when µMv < 0,























The equilibrium amount of debt D = PD (V0, c̄) corresponds to the (highest) fixed point
given by equation (4),
PD
(
V E +D, c̄
)
= D.
Such a fixed point obviously exists if the solvency constraint is satisfied, and D = PD = c̄/r.
Let’s consider the case when the solvency constraint is violated. In this case, the price of
debt contract is given by equation (34),













Consider f (x) = PD
(
V E + x, c̄
)




≥ 0 and f (c̄/r) =
PD
(
V E + c̄/r, c̄
)
− c̄/r ≤ 0. Due to the continuity of the first order derivative of the value
function, PD ( ·, c̄) is continuous. Therefore, there exists x0, such that f (x0) = 0.68 This
value gives us the equilibrium amount of debt D (c̄), corresponding to the coupon rate c̄.
68If there is more than one fixed point, then the agent chooses the contract corresponding to the highest
amount of debt for the given coupon rate.
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D Regression Coeffi cients
This appendix considers the OLS regression of credit spreads on equity volatility corre-
sponding to two events: the change in asset volatility and the subsequent change in asset
allocation.
Denote ∆1s and ∆1σE, respectively, the changes in credit spreads and equity volatility
before the allocation adjustment, and ∆2s and ∆2σE the corresponding changes at the time
of the adjustment. OLS regression coeffi cients α and β minimize the square deviations from
the regression line,




































∆s2 − α− β∆2σE
)
∆2σ
E = 0. (163)
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By the continuity of debt prices, when the adjustment time goes to zero, ∆2s → 0 and
∆1s → ∆s, where ∆s is the change in credit spreads corresponding to the changes in asset





When the value of assets is high relative to the amount of debt, equity volatility is
approximately πM1 σ1 before the change in the risky asset volatility. After the volatility
shock, equity volatility is approximately πM1 σ2 before the allocation adjustment, and π
M
2 σ2
after the adjustment. Therefore,
∆1σ
E ≈ πM1 (σ2 − σ1) = πM1 ∆σ, (166)
and
∆2σ































Thus, the slope coeffi cient is approximately proportional to the sensitivity of credit spreads
to asset volatility when the value of assets is high relative to the amount of debt.
E Data Cleaning and Merging
This appendix provides a detailed description of the data cleaning and merging procedure.
Table IX shows numbers of records, security issues, and issuers remaining at each step.
The snapshot of the enhanced TRACE database used in this research contains 114,213,116
transaction records from 07/01/2002 to 12/31/2012. Among these records, there are double
counted transaction records entered by both parties of transactions, canceled records, and
records corresponding to cancellations, reversions, and adjustments of transactions. A clean-
ing procedure that removes such records is provided in Dick-Neilsen (2014). This procedure
deletes approximately one-third of records. There are 75,523,139 records remaining after
applying this procedure.
Some of the remaining trades are non-standard and may have prices deviated from the
prevailing market valuation. For example, FINRA Rule 6730 instructs to use “special price”
modifier “if a transaction is not executed at a price that reflects the current market price”.
To have consistent prices, I delete trades made under special conditions, commissioned trades
and trades with non-standard settlements.69 There are 71,029,138 transaction records re-
maining in the dataset after this step.
To obtain information about issues and issuers and corresponding credit histories, I merge




Description Observation Issue Issuer
Original Enhanced Trace dataset 114,213,116 88,467
After applying the Dick-Neilsen cleaning procedure 75,523,139 83,142
Excluding non-standard/special transactions 71,029,138 79,4939
TRACE transactions merged with FISD database 69,305,575 69,080 6,195
USD denominated securities of US issuers 63,908,582 55,030 5,347
Corporate debentures and notes 50,604,067 26,342 4,228
Non-financial bonds 27,842,505 14,644 3,334
Fixed coupon bonds 27,080,456 13,698 3,192
Excluding credit-enhanced bonds 20,749,572 10,347 2,259
Excluding callable bonds 4,658,102 3,072 761
Excluding puttable, convertible or exchangeable
bonds
4,538,738 2,917 741
Excluding private placements 4,536,674 2,883 720
Senior debt only 4,464,438 2,501 632
Excluding bonds backed by assets 4,464,102 2,499 631
Bonds with valid pricing info 4,144,610 2,464 629
Transactions with consistent price and yield data 4,099,046 2,437 626
Daily Observations 769,233 2,437 626
Monthly observations 90,774 2,437 626
TRACE monthly observations merged with CRSP
companies
61,752 1,271 458
Observations with CRSP stock data 44,037 906 303
TRACE merged with Compustat using CCM 44,023 906 303
Observations with quarterly debt data 42,113 896 300
Differences and returns constructed using monthly
obs.
41,217 877 294
Excluding infrequently traded bonds (100 days) 40,441 865 288
Excluding crisis time (09/01/08 to 05/31/09) 38,122 865 288
Excluding observations with bonds rated below A 12,397 286 69
Final dataset with long-term bonds only 3,351 65 29
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the remaining TRACE transactions with FISD database using nine-digit CUSIPs. The
merged dataset has 69,305,575 transactions. Among these transactions, there are 63,908,582
records corresponding to dollar-denominated securities issued by US companies.
The TRACE database has transactions corresponding to different debt securities. In addi-
tion to corporate bonds, TRACE has agency debt, asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), etc. I select records corresponding to corporate debentures and
medium-term notes. There are 50,604,067 such transaction records. Among these records,
27,842,505 records correspond to bonds of non-financial companies.70 The majority of these
transactions, 27,080,456, correspond to fixed coupon bonds.71 Among these transactions,
there are 20,749,572 transactions corresponding to bonds without credit enhancements.
Approximately three-quarter of the remaining bonds is callable. There are 4,658,102
transactions corresponding to non-callable bonds. Some of the remaining bonds are put-
table, convertible or exchangeable. There are 4,538,738 records corresponding to bonds
without these kinds of optionality. To mitigate liquidity issues, I exclude private placement
debt. 4,536,674 of transactions correspond to publicly traded bonds. Most of these records,
4,464,438, correspond to senior debt. Several of the remaining bonds are marked in FISD
as backed by assets or defeased. The remaining 4,464,102 transactions correspond to bonds
satisfying the selection criteria.
Some transactions have the reported yield inconsistent with the reported price. To elim-
70Financial companies are identified by group code 2 in FISD database.
71I require that bonds have periodic coupon payments and that the coupon cannot be altered.
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inate such transactions, I reprice bonds using SAS function finance ( price, . . . ). There
are 4,144,610 transaction records with valid pricing information (such as the coupon per-
cent, payment frequency, day count rule, and bond maturity72). I re-price these transactions
using reported yields and exclude bonds if the re-calculated price differs from the reported
price by more than five basis points (five cents per 100 dollar face value).73 This eliminates
approximately one percent of transactions. There are 4,099,046 transactions corresponding
to 2,437 issues of 626 companies remaining. These transactions correspond to 769,233 daily
observations. To construct monthly observations, I use the last observation in each month.
There are 90,774 monthly observations corresponding to transactions in the selected dataset.
To obtain the stock market capitalization, remaining monthly observations are merged
with CRSP database using the historical and current six-digit CUSIPs. There are 61,752
observations for which the CRSP company identifiers, permco, are found. Stock prices
and numbers of shares outstanding are available for 44,037 observations. Almost all these
observations, 44,023, can be matched to Compustat (using CCM dataset). Quarterly debt
data is available for 42,113 transaction records. These transactions are used to construct
41,217 difference observations corresponding to returns and changes in credit spreads and
explanatory variables.
I discard observations with more than 100 days between two consecutive trades. This
eliminates approximately two percent of observations; 40,441 observations remain in the
72I also require the settlement day to be prior to the bond maturity. This excludes defaulted bonds that
are traded after the bond maturity.
73Some difference between the recalculated and reported values can be due to the difference in payment
schedule calculations in SAS function finance(‘price’, ...) utilized to recalculate values.
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dataset. 38,122 of these observations do not overlap with the period of the financial distress
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (from September 2008 till May 2009) that was asso-
ciated with rapid market changes that limited abilities of companies to adjust, a liquidity
squeeze, and government interventions that affected prices. There are 115 monthly periods
remaining.
I use A as the cut-off credit rating for the high-quality debt. In my sample, there are
12,397 observations corresponding to credit ratings A and above assigned by both S&P and
Moody’s. This is approximately one-third of the remaining observations. To select long-term
debt, I follow Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and consider bonds with more than 12 years to
maturity. Some of the long-term bonds have very long maturities (up to 100 years). Since
the maximum maturity of available Treasury yields is limited by twenty years during the
period from February 18, 2002 to February 9, 2006, the calculation of credit spreads may be
not reliable for very long maturities. To address this issue, I exclude observations with bonds
maturing in more than twenty-five years. There are 3,351 observations corresponding to 65
bonds of 29 issuers that satisfy all criteria. These observations comprise the final dataset.
Table X shows the list of companies in this dataset with the number of bonds, total number
of observations and observation periods for bonds of each company. Table XI shows the list




No. Company Name Industry Bonds Observ. Months
1 AIR PRODS & CHEMS INC Manufacturing 1 15 15
2 ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO Manufacturing 3 206 108
3 BECTON DICKINSON & CO Manufacturing 2 161 107
4 BOEING CO Manufacturing 4 251 88
5 BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO Manufacturing 2 212 115
6 CATERPILLAR INC Manufacturing 2 117 81
7 COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 5 269 58
8 DEERE & CO Manufacturing 5 167 60
9 DOVER CORP Manufacturing 1 87 87
10 EATON CORP Manufacturing 3 64 38
11 HALLIBURTON CO Manufacturing 1 12 12
12 HERSHEY CO Manufacturing 2 168 114
13 HILLENBRAND INDS INC Manufacturing 1 12 12




Manufacturing 1 64 64
16 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Manufacturing 3 236 115
17 JOHNSON CTLS INC Manufacturing 1 17 17
18 LILLY ELI & CO Manufacturing 1 81 81
19 LUBRIZOL CORP Manufacturing 1 12 12
20 MERCK & CO INC Manufacturing 1 115 115
21 PFIZER INC Manufacturing 1 37 37
22 PPG INDS INC Manufacturing 1 26 26
23 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO Manufacturing 1 1 1
24 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP Manufacturing 3 227 112
25 DONNELLEY R R & SONS CO Media/Communicat. 1 7 7
26 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 9 395 115
27 LOWES COS INC Retail 2 164 84
28 MAY DEPT STORES CO Retail 4 39 12




CUSIP Company Name Industry Observations
009158AJ5 AIR PRODS & CHEMS INC Manufacturing 15
039483AH5ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO Manufacturing 32
039483AM4ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO Manufacturing 82
039483AN2ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO Manufacturing 92
075887AN9BECTON DICKINSON & CO Manufacturing 106
075887AQ2BECTON DICKINSON & CO Manufacturing 55
097023AD7BOEING CO Manufacturing 46
097023AE5BOEING CO Manufacturing 59
097023AG0BOEING CO Manufacturing 58
097023AM7BOEING CO Manufacturing 88
110122AA6BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO Manufacturing 97
110122AB4BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO Manufacturing 115
149123AZ4 CATERPILLAR INC Manufacturing 40
149123BD2CATERPILLAR INC Manufacturing 77
191219AP9COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 58
191219AQ7COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 58
191219AU8COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 58
191219AY0COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 58
191219BB9COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC Manufacturing 37
244199AU9DEERE & CO Manufacturing 17
244199AW5DEERE & CO Manufacturing 60
244199AZ8 DEERE & CO Manufacturing 26
244199BA2DEERE & CO Manufacturing 26
244199BD6DEERE & CO Manufacturing 38
260003AC2DOVER CORP Manufacturing 87
278058AM4EATON CORP Manufacturing 21
278058AP7EATON CORP Manufacturing 6
278058AW2EATON CORP Manufacturing 37
406216AH4HALLIBURTON CO Manufacturing 12
427866AE8HERSHEY CO Manufacturing 59
427866AL2 HERSHEY CO Manufacturing 109
431573AB0HILLENBRAND INDS INC Manufacturing 12
438516AC0HONEYWELL INTL INC Manufacturing 4
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Table XI
List of Bonds (cont.)
CUSIP Company Name Industry Observations
459200AG6INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS Manufacturing 64
478160AF1 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Manufacturing 102
478160AJ3 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Manufacturing 89
478160AL8 JOHNSON & JOHNSON Manufacturing 45
478366AG2JOHNSON CTLS INC Manufacturing 17
532457AM0LILLY ELI & CO Manufacturing 81
549271AA2LUBRIZOL CORP Manufacturing 12
589331AC1MERCK & CO INC Manufacturing 115
717081AQ6PFIZER INC Manufacturing 37
693506AQ0PPG INDS INC Manufacturing 26
742718BJ7 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO Manufacturing 1
913017AR0UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP Manufacturing 61
913017AS8 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP Manufacturing 69
913017AT6 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP Manufacturing 97
257867AC5DONNELLEY R R & SONS CO Media/Communications 7
239753BC9DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 39
239753BG0DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 13
239753BJ4 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 45
239753BL9 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 36
239753BM7DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 47
239753BU9DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 14
239753CJ3 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 1
239753DJ2 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 100
239753DL7 DAYTON HUDSON CORP Retail 100
548661AH0LOWES COS INC Retail 83
548661AK3LOWES COS INC Retail 81
577778AR4MAY DEPT STORES CO Retail 11
577778AX1MAY DEPT STORES CO Retail 10
577778AZ6 MAY DEPT STORES CO Retail 7
577778BF9 MAY DEPT STORES CO Retail 11
931142AU7WAL MART STORES INC Retail 101
931142BF9WAL MART STORES INC Retail 84
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